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ABSTRACT

o f the dissertation of
o f Peter Chuka Olemgbe for the Doctor of Philosophy
An abstract of

in Urban Studies presented February 16, 2006.

Title: Oregon's
Oregon’s Approach To Health Care Reform: An Analysis of the Role of the
Business Community in the Evolution ooff the Oregon health plan.

On February 1,
1994, the state of
1,1994,
o f Oregon implemented its landmark health
reform legislation- the Oregon health plan. The plan was conceived as an insurance
program which uses a prioritized list of
o f treatment protocols to ration health care
services to Oregon's
Oregon’s poor residents.
During the planning and implementation process of the program, various
groups (political stakeholders) participated to bring the program to fruition. Although
it is commonly known that one of these stakeholders was the Oregon business
community, it is not clear what form its participation took and the nature of its
influence. While it is generally assumed that businesses are biased against
government interventions, the kind of support given by the Oregon business
community toward the program's
program’s evolution defies this commonly held view of
business-political behavior. Given this state of affairs, the purpose ooff this research is to
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analyze the role the Oregon business community played in the evolution and
implementation of the Oregon health plan.
The research strategy that is used in this research endeavor is a case study
approach and an historical analysis. It utilized both primary and secondary data
sources. Primary data sources came from elite interviewing while secondary data
sources came from state of Oregon archival records. Data collected from theses
sources were analyzed qualitatively within a socio-economic, socio-political context.
The research finds that the Oregon business community supported the Oregon
health plan, although the coalition within the business community supporting the plan
was very fragile. The research also finds that the businesses community’s
community's "economic
“economic
self-interest"
self-interest” was a primary motivator for that support and that fear of adverse
legislation that potentially could threaten its interests was a secondary concern.
Overall, this research study concludes that the support given by the Oregon
business community to the Oregon health plan’s
plan's evolution was symbolic, strategic and
political.
The study provides insights for other states considering similar health care
reform legislation and it is hoped that this research endeavor would contribute to the
literature of health care politics.
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Preamble:

Whoever provides medical care or pays the costs of illness stands to gain the gratitude
and goodwill of the sick and their families. The prospect of these good-will returns to
investment in health care creates a powerful motive for governments and other
institutions to intervene in the economics of medicine — Paul Starr, P. 235

Chapter 1: Introduction and Overview

For much of the last two decades, there has been a lot of discussion in the
academic and political arenas regarding health care reform. Generally, these
discussions have centered on escalating national health care expenditures and the
problems surrounding those individuals who have no health insurance. Flowever, there
is not yet a nationwide health insurance policy that is focused on this segment of the
population. Many special interest groups, such as the American Chamber of
Commerce, and other conservative groups such, as the American Medical
Association, oppose the idea for different reasons. For this, the failure of national
health insurance legislation - a key element of health care reform in the United States
- means that health care provision in the United States will likely remain
predominantly private - hence, the status quo.
The plight o f the uninsured is not a problem for government alone. It is also a
problem for the business community. This is so because the business community must
contend with the escalating cost o f health care premiums for their employees. For
example, former Chrysler Chairman Lee Iacocca, testifying in 1988 before a

congressional committee, stated that his company paid more for employee health
benefits than it paid for steel (Dieffenbach, 2003). According to Dieffenbach, at the
time of Iacocca’s testimony, Chrysler’s cost of providing health benefits was $700.00
per car manufactured in the United States versus $223 for the same car built in
Canada. The question then is: Is Chrysler’s experience typical of other American
business? The short answer is: Most observers would agree that this is the case.

On a philosophical level, American businesses have a long held belief that
most of society’s social and economic problems can better be solved by a private
sector, free-market approach. They contend that when government gets involved, such
societal problems become exacerbated to the detriment of business. This is the
conservative view of American business. However, liberal reformers would argue that
there is something wrong with this mind-set. Those reformers believe that a public
sector solution in health care has many advantages for business (Dieffenbach, 2003).
In Walter B. Maher’s “Rekindling reform: How goes business,” there was the
suggestion that “employers were the major cause o f the failure of president Clinton’s
Health Security Bill”(Maher, 2003:92). He adds that the lessons that can be learned
from the Clinton plan debate, if heeded by both employers and health care reform
advocates, raise hope that key elements of the business community can play a positive
role in the next comprehensive health reform effort.
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What this dissertation is about
This dissertation is about Oregon’s approach to health care reform.
Specifically, the research is focused on the Oregon Health Plan and the role the
Oregon business community played in the formulation and implementation of this
particular health care reform program in the State o f Oregon. To determine the role the
Oregon business community played in this reform effort, this research examines the
history, the legislative process, and the implementation stages of this health reform
program. More importantly, it also focuses on various groups that interacted with the
business community in achieving this ambitious reform that the State of Oregon
embarked on starting in the early 1980s.

The Oregon health plan: Historical Overview.
The historical origin of Oregon’s approach to health care reform goes back to
1987. In that particular year, the state of Oregon faced a budget shortfall in its
Medicaid program. In addition to this, the rising cost o f health care and the growing
number of people unable to afford it presented conditions that threatened the social
and economic health of the state. The state o f Oregon responded to this situation by
articulating a health care reform program to keep its citizens healthy. The program that
resulted was popularly known as the Oregon health plan (OHP).

The Oregon Health plan (OHP) is the embodiment of Oregon’s approach to
health care reform. It is a unique plan in that it represents a significant change in the
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way health care reform is implemented in this country. From 1989-1993, the Oregon
legislature passed a series of laws (five in all) which created the program. According
to Baker (1994:6), “Senate Bill (SB 27), the center-piece of the OHP created a Health
Services Commission and mandated that the State provide a basic level of health care
to all its citizens’’ whose incomes are “at or below the federal poverty level (FPL)
through a reformed Medicaid program”(Baker,1994: 6). Baker (1994) further states
that another Bill, Senate Bill (SB 935) created incentives for small businesses to make
health insurance available to their employees. In addition, the bill mandated employers
to give their employees and their dependant health care coverage with a benefits
package equal to or greater than the one provided in the package to Medicaid
recipients. This provision was to take effect in 1995. Another Senate Bill (SB 534)
established the Oregon Medical Insurance Pool (OMIP) that would provide health
insurance to Oregonians unable to obtain insurance on their own due to pre-existing
conditions (The Oregon Health Plan, 1993, p. 18). As this Bill was fashioned, it is a
state subsidized risk pool and participants (i.e. enrollees) would pay premiums
determined by Oregon’s health insurance earners. All together, these three statutes
enacted into law in 1989 became the Oregon Basic Services Act, the forerunner of the
Oregon health plan (OHP). With two more bills added later, i.e. Senate Bill 44 (SB 44)
which expanded the Oregon health plan to include the blind, disabled, aged, and foster
children, and Senate Bill (SB 1076) that related to health benefits plans, (i.e. requiring
all insurance companies in the state to offer an insurance plan equal to the basic
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package developed under Senate Bill 27) the plan went into effect on February 1,
1994.

Health care reform in Oregon
From its inception, the Oregon health plan (OHP) was, and is still an insurance
program aimed at the States’ uninsured low-income residents. As it was designed, the
(OHP) was an expanded Medicaid program that in essence legalized health care
rationing in the State of Oregon Medicaid program. This rationing program was an
extension of a policy adopted in 1987 whereby Oregon ended public expenditures for
organ transplants (Julnes and Mason, 1989). In particular, during the 1987 Oregon
legislative session, an appropriations sub-committee cut off funding for such
procedures as liver and bone marrow transplants. When this decision was made, the
public did not seem to notice until the death of a seven-year old boy named Coby
Howard. This boy’s death aroused the conscience of the citizens of the state, and it
opened a discussion regarding the issue o f rationing health care for the poor in the
state o f Oregon. The proponents of rationing had maintained that it was unacceptable
for a few individuals to receive expensive and costly treatments such as transplants
whereas a vast number of people went without any health care at all.
In the real world, health care rationing takes on a whole new meaning when
implementation is actually attempted, and this was the case with Oregon’s experiment.
During the 1989 legislative session, the Oregon legislature passed a bill - SB 27. This
bill passed overwhelmingly in Oregon’s bicameral legislature. According to Julnes
and Mason (1989: 2), there was “no significant or organized opposition to the bill.”
5

Part o f the bill as it was passed would extend Medicaid coverage to all individuals at
100% o f federal poverty level and below. Before this period, Oregon was providing
coverage to those at 58% of the federal poverty level. However, after the passage of
the bill, more low-income Oregonians had access to health care. But more access
meant a significant cost to the people of the state and the state treasury. For one thing,
the amount of money budgeted for Medicaid services was not proportionately
increased even though coverage was extended to more individuals. For another, the
increased enrollment in the program meant that the system of delivering care was
overwhelmed resulting in, perhaps, inadequate quality of care for the consumers. The
point here is that logically, the number of services provided for each enrollee
decreased. The consequence of all these emerging situations is that the state had to
grapple with which services would be covered and which would not, hence the state
delegated responsibility to the States’ Health Services Commission that was appointed
by the governor to sort out a solution.

Statement of the Problem and Purpose of the Research
Before the advent of the Oregon Health Plan, there was no disagreement
among Oregon’s citizens that a large number o f Oregon’s low-income residents did
not have health insurance. While this was the case, there seemed to be no consensus
on how to address the problem. According to a report published by the State Office of
Medical Assistance in 1993, the reasons for this were obvious: Oregon’s health care
system, just like in many other states across the United States, had evolved in a piece-
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meal fashion instead o f as a result of a long term policy vision. (The Oregon Health
Plan, 1993). As a result of this situation, “independent, short term policy decisions
benefiting special interests created enormous coverage gaps and contributed to a rising
cost” (The Oregon Health Plan, 1993:1). The report further stated that politically,
“each group focused on escaping costs rather than mutually controlling them” and that
since no one was held accountable, the status quo was defended (The Oregon Health
Plan, 1993:1).

Although it is commonly known that the Oregon business community participated
in the formulation of the Oregon Health Plan, it is not clear what form that
participation took. While it is generally assumed that businesses tend to dislike
government mandates, during the formulation of the Oregon Health Plan, they seemed
to actively support it. Given this state of affairs, the purpose of this dissertation is to
analyze the role the Oregon business community played in the evolution and
implementation of the health plan. For purposes o f a detailed analysis of the role the
business community played during the health plan’s evolution and implementation, the
following questions are examined in this study:

1. If they really supported the plan, what was the nature of that support?
2. What factors influenced the business community’s support for the Oregon
health plan? For purposes of a thorough exploration of question #2 the
following subsets to that question are also examined:
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(a) Did the Oregon business community support the health plan as a means to
affect the legislation before the legislation affected the business community?
(b) Did the Oregon business community support OHP as a larger policy objective
of controlling health care costs, thereby reducing its own expenses?
(c) Did the Oregon business community support OHP due to mutuality of interest?
(d) Did the Oregon business community support OHP based on its need for
organizational survival?
3. Now that the program has been implemented, what are the current perceptions
of the Oregon business community about the Oregon health plan?

In addition, this research also examines the political behavior of the Oregon business
community by exploring the processes that contribute to business political unity and
coalition building when its interests are at stake in the formulation and implementation
of a public policy. By using examples of various coalition models in health care
reform, the study also addresses the logic of business unity and coalition formation
For purposes o f clarification or definition, this research study defines the Oregon
business community as comprising all Oregon businesses, whether large or small, that
are affected by state regulation and/or legislation. In this context, it includes Oregon
businesses whose primary business is health care and Oregon businesses whose
primary business is not health care.
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The significance of the research study
This research study is significant because it will enhance our understanding of what
will likely be required for a continuation of support from the business community for
the Oregon Health Plan. It will provide valuable insights for other states considering
similar health reform legislation. Equally important, it will contribute to the literature
of health care politics.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

This chapter provides a review of the literature discussing the concept of
healthcare reform in the United States. It also examines healthcare coalitions,
business-political behavior, and the logic of business unity. Furthermore, it examines
the role major stakeholders play in health care reform at the national, state and
community levels. Finally, it examines Oregon’s business community’s role in
Oregon’s experiment within the context of health care reform.

The Concept of Healthcare Reform

In the past few decades, there has been ample literature discussing the topic of
healthcare reform in the United States. Various academic researchers have provided
lengthy discussions explaining healthcare reform in the context of their own particular
topics. As such, the concept of healthcare reform can be described as an amorphous
concept having various meanings for different people. This is evident based on the
works of various researchers and health policy experts. For example, Kronenfeld and
Kronenfeld (2004) have described it as a modification of the United States health care
system so that affordable, high quality health services are available to everyone. What
is missing in this description is an understanding that health care reform has a broad
and complicated meaning, and that much is dependent on what is involved in the
reform, who is doing the reform and whom the reform is impacting. For instance,
10

when the federal government is dealing with the issue o f health care reform, it might
mean a prescription drug benefit for America’s elderly and not the health insurance
needs of the nation’s poor residents. Reforming Medicare or Medicaid at the federal
level could mean different things depending on the political philosophy of the party in
power. Conservative administrations, such as the present Republican Party, have their
own notions o f health care reform, and perhaps, may actually believe that health care
reform is a question for the market system to deal with and not for government. On the
other hand, liberal administrations, as exemplified by the Democratic Party in the
United States, might look at the issue of health care reform as a question for
government action and not that of the market to deal with. Also, the poor, uninsured
citizen may look at the whole issue from a different prism. Given these various
contexts, health care reform can be hard to define, or rather, understand. However,
what is important is not an all-inclusive definition, but rather an appreciation that
health care reform can be viewed from a variety of perspectives.

The debate concerning the need for health care reform has moved beyond the
dilemma of “to change or not to change,” according to Silver-Wells (1987). In the
1970s, theoretical frameworks for health systems reform in the United States were
proposed by Somers and Somers (1977), Laframboise (1973), Carlson and
Cunningham (1973) and Fuchs (1977). At that time, reform entailed shifting the
direction of the health delivery system from a predominant emphasis on care and cure
of the sick to a positive health policy with a focus on promoting and maintaining good
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health. However, putting this theory into practice presented a big challenge for
policymakers. For one thing, achieving a national health care system reform involved
changing the direction of national health policy. In addition, it also involved changing
behaviors of governments, providers, and consumers whose needs were intricately
linked to the health care sector. In the 1980s, this emphasis shifted to seeking and
implementing reforms that especially catered to a growing segment of the population
(i.e., the poor and uninsured citizens) that have over the course of several decades
been marginalized or literally ignored.

Given this issue that never seemed to fade away from the political horizon of
the United States in the 1980s, the perennial question for policymakers became: What
should government do to ameliorate the problem of this segment of the population?
Consequently, various levels of government (federal, state and even local) proposed
programs that would in effect help to overhaul the nation’s health care system under
the rubric of health care reform. But the huge challenge confronting governments in
enacting the reforms continued despite their best efforts to achieve some measures of
success. Feldstein (2001) recently notes that “the rapid rise in medical expenditures”
and its continuing consumption of the nation’s resources represent a massive
redistribution of wealth. According to Feldstein (2001), two groups in particular have
benefited more in this scheme than any other groups in the American population.
Feldstein identifies the two groups as the “aged”with the Medicare program and the
other group as those employed in the medical sector such as health care suppliers and
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providers, hospitals and physicians. Feldstein adds that the role o f government
(whether federal or State) in financing and regulating medical services is extensive.

Feldstein (2001) provides a theoretical framework for understanding and
hence forecasting the type o f health legislation or regulation this country has or will
have. The competing theories Feldstein identifies are “public interest” and “economic”
interest. Feldstein explains that the basic assumption underlying the public interest
theory is that legislation is enacted because well-meaning legislators act according to
what they believe is in the public interest. Feldstein says that dissatisfaction with the
public interest theory led to the economic theory of regulation. He points out that the
basic assumption underlying the economic theory is that political markets are no
different from economic markets. According to Feldstein (2001:45) “political
markets” have legislative benefits and usually the benefits that are provided to a group
exceed the associated financial costs that the group incurs. In this context “individuals
and firms seek to further their self interest’’(Feldstein, 2001 p.9).

Besides economic self-interest of individuals and firms, the question therefore
is: What are the real objectives of government and why does government have such
objectives? Feldstein provides these two principal objectives for government behavior:
“to improve efficiency and to redistribute income in a more equitable manner”(p. 6).
According to Feldstein, the second objective, “redistribution causes a change in
wealth”(p.7). This view has earlier been noted by public policy experts such as
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Peterson (1979) and Wolf (1979). In particular, Peterson (1979) distinguishes three
types of policy arenas in his analysis of expenditure patterns of national, state and
local governments. The three Peterson identifies are: (1) Allocational policies (2)
Developmental policies and (3) Re-distributive policies. Of all these three policy
arenas, Peterson says that the re-distributive policies are the main function of the
federal government hence, “welfare, social security, and other forms of social
insurance, health and hospital care (p.311). W olf (1979) contributes to this perspective
by stating that governments will intervene in the market place because “left to its own
devices” the market place will not entail re-distributive policies because of the free
rider problem associated with public programs.

Researchers also have focused on the question of the incentives that federalism
creates for states (Peterson1995; Beamer 1999). For example, Peterson (1995)
highlights the disincentives for states to invest heavily in re-distributive programs, but
Beamer (1999) shows why States also have an incentive under a federal system to
capture available funds and to promote policies that spread the benefits of public
goods (like subsidized health care insurance coverage). Beamer’s and Peterson’s
views are consistent with Feldstein’s (2001) explanation of the role of national
government in health care spending. In particular, Peterson’s views from an economic
perspective have implications for the federal government’s interest in health care
spending even though Peterson did not specifically refer to that kind o f spending in his
analysis.
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Another important point is that even though the federal government plays an
important role in health care spending, it has not been alone in harnessing the future of
health care reform in this country by sheer means of its vast resources. Equally playing
significant roles in health care reform have been the state governments through
legislation and regulation. But legislation and regulation are not the only means that
state governments have used to play important roles in health care reform, they have
also played these critical roles by spending their own tax dollars. In short, when it
comes to health care reform three important ingredients are always present: i.e.
money, regulation and legislation. Consequently, the synergy for health care reform
develops when there is cooperation between various levels of governments and other
stakeholders.

The juxtapositions of health care reform are evident in health care legislation across
the country as exemplified by the varying forms and standards for reforms. For
example, Goldwater (2000), Lunch (2000), Weil (1999), Stone (1996), Immergut
(1992) and Goldberger (1990) examined the juxtaposed frameworks in their works.
As an example, Goldwater (2000) used the case of health care reform in the State of
Maryland to demonstrate that state regulation o f the health care delivery system is a
form of health care reform. Although Maryland is not typical of other states when one
considers that Maryland has the “highest number of mandated benefits in the nation,”
nevertheless what happened there did represent the kind of initiative that states take

15

when confronting the problem o f reform in their respective communities (Goldwater,
2000:65). In the case of Oregon, Lunch (2000:33) notes that the desire to revise the
“state guidelines for Medicaid funding in the mid-eighties to emphasize prevention of
illness” was one of the catalysts for the formulation of the Oregon health plan.
According to Lunch (2000:35), when the OHP was formulated in 1989 through
legislation, the plan as formulated “proposed to expand the number o f Oregonians who
could qualify for public health care through Medicaid and it “did so by explicitly
rationing the medical procedures available.” Other states have also either used
regulation to achieve reform of their own or legislation to accomplish the same
purpose. For instance, Hawaii, a pioneer in health care reform, passed its Prepaid
Health Care Act in 1974. This act provided the state with the impetus on reforming
its health care system with the goal of moving in the direction of universal access.
Consequently, in 1989, the State of Hawaii created its Health Insurance Program
(SHIP) through legislation. This program put the state on the path to achieving
universal access to health care for its population. Similarly, in New Jersey, a health
care reform act was passed by its legislature in 1992 (Volpp and Siebel, 1993). This
act, although not like what these other states had which was to ultimately achieve
universal access, nevertheless, was designed to rein in the costs of health care in the
state. Volpp and Siegal (1993) maintain that “ under the legislation, price regulation
and the DRG system ended” while hospital revenue caps remained in place for a oneyear transition period. Further discussion on some States’ initiatives in the area of
regulation and legislation is in Chapter 5 of this study.
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Although these states’ initiatives have taken place, historically various
politicians at the national and state level have proposed programs to overhaul the
national health care delivery system. Starr (1995) and Stabrowski (2003) have
documented this in their works. For instance, Stan- (1995: 21) discusses President
Clinton’s health care reform proposal that failed and the effort made by a few senators
prior to the president’s initiative to overhaul the nation’s health care system. Starr
specifically noted that prior to Clinton’s health care proposal, twenty-three Republican
senators including then senate minority Leader Robert Dole, had cosponsored a bill in
1993 introduced by then Senator John Chafee that “sought to achieve universal
coverage through a mandate -that is, a mandate on individuals to buy insurance.”
At the micro-level, Paul-Shaheen (1998) indicates at least seven states whose
politicians have taken the lead in the effort to overhaul their health care system. The
states she mentions are Florida, Hawaii, Massachusetts, Mimieosota, Oregon, Vermont
and Washington State. In addtion, Bodenheimer (1997), Sipes-Metzler (1994) and
Sperer (1993) also note that local policy makers implement health care reform
programs at the state and community levels. In particular, Bodenheimer (1997) used
the case o f Oregon to demonstrate how an activist leadership at the state level or
innovative leaders at local level can accomplish health reform. For example, when the
OHP was formulated, then -Senator John Kitzhaber led the state in pushing for the
reform. After OHP was implemented, there was concern about how to shift Medicaid
patients from “safety-net providers ” to “private managed care- plans”
(Bodenheimer,1997:721). Bodenheimer points out that in Oregon’s case, a group of
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safety- net providers took the lead and provided this critical leadership. The group he
identifies as leading this effort was Oregon Health Sciences University (OHSU), the
Multnomah County Health Department (in Portland), and a number of community
health centers. These groups formed one HMO, CareOregon, to provide care for
patients in the Oregon Health Plan. According to Bodenheimer (1997:721), similar
“alliances have been established in California.”
On a more recent note, Swenson and Greer (2003), and Mintz and Palmer
(2000) indicate that health care provision in the United States has changed
dramatically in the last two decades primarily at the state level. However, Mintz and
Palmer caution: “Business’s role in this state-level process is not well understood” (p
328). Elaborating on this, they state: “We assume that business was involved in the
reform effort given their interest in containing their employee health insurance costs,
but know little about the details of their participation” (Mintz and Palmer 2000:328).
On the basis of this notion, Mintz and Palmer conducted an analysis of business
involvement in health care reform in the 50 states in the 1980s. What they found was
that business was divided into three main groups with regard to health care reform in
the 1980s. According to Mintz and Palmer, there were non-health care firms
championing reform, health care businesses resisting reform, and insurers seeking to
channel reform in directions that preserved their profitability. They also found that
each group contained both large and small companies with often differing views and
objectives in the policy arena. For example, large health care corporations tending to
view reform as inevitable generally cooperated with reform efforts while small health

care companies were more likely to defend the status quo. Since all these businesses
(large or small) operate in the political arena, they are part of stakeholders in the high
stakes game of health care reform.

Major Stakeholders in Health Care Reform

In the battle for health care reform there are many political stakeholders.
Among these stakeholders are providers and consumers, business and labor leaders,
insurers and lawmakers. In order for any of the stakeholders to succeed in their
purpose, they usually co-opt members from the other groups and form a coalition.
Johnson (1993) attempted to provide a framework for looking at and defining a
coalition. According to Johnson, there are three characteristics important in defining a
coalition. The three characteristics include (1) membership, (2) activities, and (3) the
geographic influence o f the coalition. However, Goldbeck’s (1984) characterization of
coalitions, although consistent with Johnson (1993) in a broad sense, has a peculiar
interpretation in that it focuses on health care reform as it relates to membership
interest. According to Goldbeck (1984), health care coalitions possess three
characteristics: purchaser representation, promotion of local rather than national
concerns, and the objectives of healthcare cost containment (as in Johnson, 1993:
557). The Dunlop Group defined coalitions as an “alliance of individuals and groups
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who are concerned with issues involving costs, quality, and access to health care”
(AHA, 1991). Webster’s New World Dictionary of the American language offers
another definition of a coalition. Webster’s Dictionary defines it as “a temporary
alliance o f factions or parties for a specific purpose such as of political parties.” The
relevance of this definition to health care reform can be seen in the context of strategic
alliances that are formed by disparate groups when they have a common business
interest. Clearly, in American health care reform, the principal reason for a coalition
is that reform leaders use the coalition as a base to articulate and bargain for their
groups’ business agenda. This view is consistent with Stem (1991) who argues that
individuals or organizations join coalitions for their own individual reasons and their
interests. This phenomenon is much more pervasive in the world of business than in
any other organizational area. In real life situations, it is not unusual for businesses to
form strategic alliances. A strategic alliance (coalition) is very beneficial for business,
and for that matter, businesses also enter in to coalitions just like political parties do.
Obviously, Feldstein (2001) would agree with this notion when he talks of legislative
benefits.
Business Political Behavior
In American health care reform, there are various kinds of coalitions that form
for specific business purposes. For example, The Washington Business Group on
Health (WBGH) is a business lobby group for major national corporations on health
care issues (this group is a spin-off of the Business Roundtable). Although there are
various reasons health care coalitions form, the most important reasons they do so are
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business and political. In a social choice context, coalitions act autonomously but will
readily cooperate with others for strong advocacy within an adversarial environment
(Shermerhom, 2001). In this context, the emerging behavior can be described as
typical business-political behavior -a concept that has been coined by Clawson,
Neustadtl and Bearden (1986).

It has been suggested that the business community also forms coalitions to
force change (Johnson, 1993). For example, the Central Michigan Hospital Council
and the Chamber of Commerce in the 1990’s pursued their common interest in
affordable healthcare to benefit their coalition members (Coalition Perspective,
American Hospital Association, March 1992, P.l). The Washington Business Group
on Health and the Business Roundtable work together to develop legislative policy
that affects the American business community and lobbies Congress for such policy.
Mintz (1995) discusses business participation in health care reform and
examined business political activity by exploring those corporate characteristics that
contribute to inter-corporate coalition formation. By using differing interests in
relation to health care profitability, her study shows the difficulties inherent in
corporate collective action. To illustrate this point Mintz (1995) argues that while
certain firms clearly profit from the expansion of medical delivery systems, others
with health care investments do not share equally in terms of profitability. She also
points out that other lines of division exist between businesses. For example,
unionized businesses often provide better health benefit packages to their employees
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than non-union businesses. Apart from this, health care insurance companies have well
defined interests in the continued expansion of health care services, as known today.
However, they are also feeling the pressure from other segments of the business
community as their overall profit margins are squeezed by die continued cost of one
specific sector (i.e. hospitals and doctor groups). In addition to these situational
analyses, Mintz’s (1995) study also focused on the role of business self-interest and
political behaviors. Mintz distinguished three sets of business interests in this study:
(1) Narrow individual interests; (2) Broader self-interests and (3) Class-Wide interests.
According to Mintz (1995), the broader self-interest of a business may overlap with
the individual interests of other corporations. Mintz (1995) also argued that business
political activity is normally based on the micro-interest of individual firms whereas
when it comes to collective action, business behavior is temporary and non-enduring.
Mintz’s (1995) view is based on the assumption that the business community is
divided on many issues and as Dahl (1961) and Polsby (1963) earlier observed,
corporate action is based on the particular interests of individual firms.
Although businesses sometimes form alliances depending on the issues facing
them, such alliances are usually fragile and they almost never occur unless the issue in
question threatens their collective self-interests. For example, in matters of public
policy, the business community may not see the need to unify and in point of fact may
remain ambivalent unless such a proposed policy threatens its interests. As Bergthold
(1993:804) points out, “As long as government is acting in ways that consistently
protects business interests in a given situation, there is no need for business leaders to
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intervene in a policy process.” Bergthold’s (1993) assertion has implications for the
Oregon case. In the Oregon experience, the business community got involved with the
planning and implementation stages of the program along with other citizen groups,
government, and other political leaders as demonstrated with their support of Senate
Bill 27 (SB 27). However, it is unclear whether their participation stemmed from fear
that their non-participation might result in a legislation that could potentially threaten
their self-interest and by extension, their organizational survival. This is one of the
premises that this study has tried to examine.

Business Unity and the Avoidance of Political Conflict
In explaining the theory o f business unity and the avoidance of political
conflict, Bums (1987) contends that there is a difference between what he terms “core
firms” and “peripheral firms.” He states that core firms are relatively insulated from
the competitive pressures of the market and therefore have a “bigger stake in the long
term stability of the system, and are better able to protect their profit margins by
passing on any increase in taxes to their customers” (Burris, 1987:733). It is for these
very reasons that Useem (1980:61) suggests that such firms “tend to favor progressive
labor and welfare legislation as a means of ensuring the stability of their own
workforce and more generally, domestic tranquility.” On the other hand, peripheral
firms confront a much different economic situation. Consequently, they are much
more hostile to government regulation, taxation, unionization or even welfare
spending (Burris, 1987). hi the Oregon case, small businesses as well as large ones
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participated in the formulation and implementation of the Oregon plan. However, no
one is sure what level of support there was by the small business interests - a situation
that Burris (1987) has alluded to in his analysis.

From another point of view, it is conceivable that the support offered by small
businesses to the “core firms” in Oregon through the agency of the Associated Oregon
Industries during the evolution of the Oregon health plan is due to what Clawson,
Neustadtl, and Bearden (1986) see as typical business political behavior in their own
study of the logic of business unity. In their study Clawson, Neustadtl and Bearden
(1986) find that “corporations self -consciously avoid open political conflict” once a
unified business position has developed (Clawson, Neustadtl and Bearden 1986:810).
As they see it, it is no longer “pragmatic” for a corporation to oppose the rest of
business, for the sanctions available to a unified business community are at least as
great as those available to members of congress Clawson, Neustadtl and Bearden
(p.810).”
The review of the related literature revealed a number of issues regarding
health care reform. The discussion presented here has centered on the costcontainment issue, difficulty of access to medical care by the nation’s uninsured in
general and Oregon’s low- income residents in particular due to the medical insurance
conundrum and business-political behavior. The health care coalition movement as an
aspect of health care reform strategy has been gaining momentum across the nation.
The review of the literature also noted a few specific studies that focused on the
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Oregon health reform as embodied in the Oregon health plan (OHP), Baker (1994;
Gold 1997; Fox and Leichter 1993; Leichter 1997; Julnes and Mason 1989; Thome
1997; Lunch 2000). Although the influence of the business community in the
contemporary health care debate is extensively cited, there seems to be little
information on the role Oregon’s business community played in the reform effort as
embodied in the Oregon Health Plan, hence this study.
For purposes of analysis, this study will apply the theoretical frameworks
provided by Feldstein (20001), Mintz and Palmer (2001), Bergthold (1993) and Mintz
(1995) that have previously been discussed in this study. Additionally, in the course
of this literature review, different issues, categories, themes and patterns emerged that
contributed to the researcher’s understanding of the research topic and all of which
will be helpful in the analysis that will follow in the course o f this research effort.
Consequently, the research will assess the type of Oregon businesses involved in
Oregon’s health care reform, the political positions those businesses took and the
dynamics o f creating and sustaining unity among them as they wrestled with the issue
of health care reform in Oregon as embodied in the Oregon heath plan. Based on the
literature review, it seems that the theory of self-interest of businesses as posited by
Feldstein (2001), Mintz and Palmer (2000) and Mintz (1995) may have a wide
application, although not in the orthodox sense. Also, Peterson’s (1979) public policy
domains are explored in the context o f what happened in Oregon to determine their
significance for Oregon’s experience. For purposes of clarification, this researcher
would like to point out that this research study is in no way intended to test theories.
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Rather, the study is intended to be a policy history. Therefore, it utilized the theories
as posited by these scholars to explore and understand what happened in Oregon and
perhaps, by extension, what happened in a few other states whose experiences
resemble Oregon’s approach to reform. In this context, the study may have a limited
generalizability.

Chapter 3
Methodology

This chapter presents in three parts the methodological framework for this
study. The first part is the general context in which the study is conducted. The
second part is the research design. It lays out the research strategy, data sources and
collection methods, the study’s scope and unit of analysis and sampling method. The
third part describes both the analytical method and the significance of the research
method chosen for this study. It also presents other analytical methods in the study.
The analysis of the findings is discussed in chapter 6, and in chapter 7 there is a
general discussion of the research effort and its implications for public policy. Chapter
8 deals with the limitations of the study and directions for further research.

The Research Strategy
The research strategy employed in this study is an exploratory case study as well as an
historical analysis. An exploratory case study is necessary in order to develop more indepth understanding of the phenomenon under study (Marshall and Rossman, 1995). It
is also useful when the researcher has little or no control over events or behaviors and
is the preferred method when the phenomenon being studied is contemporary (Babbie,
1986, Yin, 1984, True, 1983). Additionally, Yin (1984:23) stated that a case study is
an empirical inquiry that: “ investigates... when the boundaries between phenomenon
and context are not clearly evident; and in which multiple sources of evidence are
used.”
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The role the Oregon business community played during the planning and
implementation of the Oregon health plan is the focus of this study. The researcher
embarked on this project on a hunch rather than from his prior understanding of the
subject. To elaborate, the term “hunch” is used here by the researcher to reiterate that
the Oregon Health Plan was created through a political strategy. This researcher was
initially unaware of the different participants in this political strategy. But in reviewing
documents related to the evolution of the health reform plan, the researcher had the
“hunch” that the political strategy succeeded because it enlisted the support of
different constituent groups (stakeholders) of which the Oregon business community
was a part of. Hence, this researcher’s interest to study the Oregon business
community’s role in the process of the evolution and implementation of the health
plan.

Because the Oregon health plan is an on going program administered by the
State of Oregon, it is deemed contemporary by the researcher. Apart from applying a
case study approach to this study, the researcher equally employed an historical
analysis because this method of analysis provides new insights into events of the past
with emphasis on social meanings and the relevance of the social context
(Klegon,1981). Further, Klegon (1981) also suggests that such an approach to research
can provide new data to develop and test theories. In addition to this, it can aid in
predicting the future. Equally relevant to this research method are Marshall and
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Rossman (1995:90) who state that an “historical analysis is particularly useful in
obtaining knowledge of previously unexamined areas and reexamining questions for
which answers are not as definite as desired.” In addition to this view, Yin (1984:19)
states that historical analysis is the preferred strategy when “an investigator must rely
on primary documents, secondary documents, and cultural and physical artifacts as the
main sources of evidence.” On the basis of these advantages of the historical method,
the researcher embarked on this scientific research study with the conviction that an
historical method of case study approach is the most appropriate for this study.
Data Sources and Collection Methods
Multiple data sources were utilized in this study. These included official
government documents from the Portland State University library and the State of
Oregon archives, personal interviews, and content analysis of secondary data. Louise
Kidder (1981) indicated that although a personal interview approach has its
disadvantages, “it is relatively among the best in terms of obtaining a good sample
from a population; establishing rapport with respondents; ability to ask complex
questions at length and in-depth, and the ability to get full, detailed answers for
clarifications and probing (Kidder, 1981:149).” In this research endeavor, the
researcher interviewed key individuals who either participated in the legislative
process leading up to the formulation and implementation of the Oregon Health Plan
or had good knowledge of the process or access to the process during the period. It
was important to the researcher that these interviewees’ perspectives on the subject
matter be obtained and analyzed. The researcher was particularly interested in their
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accounts o f events as they unfolded, their responses to and interpretations of those
events and how and why the State o f Oregon negotiated with the business community
to gain its support and cooperation over time. Marshall and Rossman (1995:83) call
this kind o f interviewing “elite interviewing.” It is a special kind o f interviewing that
“focuses on a particular type of interviewee” (Marshall and Rossman, 1995:83). In an
attempt to describe the type o f individuals who can be selected for elite interviewing,
Marshall and Rossman offer this explantion:

Elite individuals are considered to be influential, prominent, and well-informed
people in an organization or community and are selected for interviews on the
basis o f their expertise in areas relevant to the research (Marshall and
Rossman, 1995:83)

In-depth interviews with multiple respondents (both bureaucrats and other State and
community leaders) were conducted in order to give the researcher the ability to
triangulate the findings across sources and maximize reliability. In addition,
secondary sources o f data for this research included the State of Oregon Department of
Human Services records that are pertinent to this research (i.e., publications and
statistics). Most of these records were in the Office of Medical Assistance Programs
and the State Office of Health Policy and Research. Other sources of secondary data
utilized in this research included legislative hearings records from the State of Oregon
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Archives and public description, (for example, medical sources including newspapers,
academic journals and electronic coverage).

Primary research question and the interview process

The primary research question for this research endeavor is: What was the role
that the Oregon business community played in the evolution of the Oregon Health
Plan?
In order to scientifically examine this topic, members of several main groups were
interviewed to elicit pertinent information in an effort to draw various perspectives on
the formulation and implementation of the OHP. Consequently, it is hoped by this
researcher that these multiple perspectives subsequently would provide good quality
data for this research endeavor.

The researcher decided on five groups to focus the interview process. These
five groups are: (1) the business community, (2) the bureaucratic elite, (3) labor, (4)
social advocacy groups and (5) political executives. Several key individuals were
interviewed from each of these groups for their unusually good insights, knowledge,
and personal experiences with the process in the development and implementation of
the OHP. The number o f individuals interviewed from each o f these groups were:
three from the Business community; four from the Business elites; two from Labor;
three from Social advocacy groups; and three from Political executives. Individuals
31

from each of these five diverse groups were asked specific interview questions tailormade to fit their roles related to the OHP and the Oregon business community. A
definition of each of these groups is shown in Appendix A.
It is important to note that prior to gaining access to the aforementioned key
individuals and scheduling an interview date, the researcher sent out a letter of
introduction, followed by a telephone call to further explain this particular academic
study o f OHP. This further telephone call also included a clarification of what period
the_researcher was interested in studying. Specifically, the researcher made it clear he
was interested mainly in the period of late 1980s to mid 1990s. Subsequently, a date,
time, and location were scheduled to carry out a face-to-face interview. Interview
questions were either faxed or mailed to participants in advance for two main reasons:
(1) Time management -respondents could more efficiently utilize the time spent
during the interview, and (2) Memory recall-respondents could provide better quality
information and richer data regarding the OHP and the business community. After
each interview, the researcher sent a “Thank You Letter” to each of the interviewees
for sharing their time and insights.

There were a total of fifteen interviews conducted in this particular study. The
number of interviewees was not predetermined in advance. The researcher employed
the “snowball technique” which is often used in qualitative social science research.
To elaborate, this technique involves interviewing as many participants as possible
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until the researcher decides that the information obtained from the respondents is
deemed to come “full circle.”
Sample Size
It is important to point out here that qualitative research methods do not require
large sample sizes. What most qualitative scientists recommend is to conduct
interviews until theoretical saturation has been reached, a point this researcher has just
noted above. Also, in the interest o f transparency of the process undertaken in this
data-gathering phase, it should be noted that the researcher’s time constraints and
concerns regarding the volume of material to be analyzed also contributed to the
decision to stop at fifteen interviews.
The fifteen interviews were conducted in different settings, and the various
locations were selected by the respondents. For example, four o f the interviews were
conducted in local area restaurants; eight interviews were conducted in the offices of
the participants, one interview was conducted in an exclusive athletic club; one
interview was conducted in a local library; and one interview was conducted in a local
University conference room.
The type of information sought was purely descriptive and qualitative in
nature. The data was recorded and transcribed in order to provide for an adequate and
accurate analysis. An informed consent form was given prior to commencement of the
interview that explained the purpose of the study and thus provided the participants
with assurance as to the integrity of the research. A copy of the informed consent used
for the study is_provided in Appendix B. Invariably, data were collected as per
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“respondent #one”, “respondent #two”, “respondent #three”, and so forth and hence
grouped into “clusters” in order to better analyze the qualitative nature of the data.
Furthermore, presenting the data in this format provides for anonymity and
confidentiality of the participants’ responses by not using “him” or “her.”

The Study’s Scope and Sample

In order to address the research question that is proposed in this study, the
research focused on the business community in the State of Oregon. There are several
types of businesses in Oregon. These businesses are considered as small, mid-sized,
or large. All are scattered throughout the state in different counties. Each of them has
different interests, needs, and expectations. Moreover, some are located in urban areas,
while others are situated in rural Oregon. Some compete with each other across the
state whereas others contend within their immediate environment. This competition
inevitably leads to different expectations and levels ofsupport for the States’ health
care reform program.

Unit of Analysis

Babbie (1986:74) argues that in social science research, “There is a wide range
o f variation in what or whom is studied.” He describes what and whom is studied as
the unit of analysis. As he defines it, units of analysis are “those units we initially
describe for the ultimate purpose of aggregating their characteristic in order to
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describe some larger group or explain some abstract phenomenon” (Babbie 1986: 74).
Yin (1984:31) added that a unit of analysis “...can be some event or entity that is less
well defined than a single individual.” In the present research study, the unit of
analysis is the Oregon business community. The Oregon business community is in the
view of the researcher, all the business organizations and their surrogates involved in
the planning process and implementation of the Oregon health plan. Thus, the
business community included the following: large and small corporations, hospitals,
insurance firms (both medical and non medical) the provider community, and doctor
groups in the State o f Oregon. Since the researcher could not possibly collect data on
each and every one of these groups, their umbrella organization was used as a
surrogate unit to gather the data, hence Associated Oregon Industries (AOI). AOI,
according to its current legislative lobbyist on health care affairs, Lisa Trussel, has in
its membership 23,000 companies.

Data analysis

The data analysis for this study began during the data collection phase and it
continued throughout the course of the study. The reason for this approach is for the
researcher to be able to filter out early in the process any of the unusual elements not
germane to the research. The researcher hoped that such an approach would be helpful
in striking a balance between efficiency and design flexibility- all necessary qualities
for good qualitative research. This view is consistent with Marshall and Rossman
(1995). According to them, “data collection and analysis go hand in hand to promote
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the emergence o f substantive theory grounded in empirical data” and they expanded
on this view by adding the “researcher is guided by initial concepts, and hypothesis,
but shifts or discards them as data are collected and analyzed” (Marshall and
Rossman, 1995:112).

Data analysis entails data reduction. The usefulness of this is to bring the
collected data into manageable chunks and to provide meaningful interpretations to the
data that has been collected. One analytic technique employed in this study is the use
of graphic displays for examining the data.
It is important to reiterate that this case study is done in the tradition of
qualitative research. According to Morse and Richards (2002:147), the whole process
of a qualitative method in research “is not linear, not stepwise but interactive” (Morse
and Richards, 2002:147). Therefore from the beginning, the researcher has had this
analytical mindset as this research was conducted.
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Chapter 4
The Legislative Process and business involvement

The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the historical basis of business
involvement in the development of the Oregon Health Plan. The chapter also discusses
the legislative process, the evolution of the States’ insurance reform, and the
development of some specific bills that were vital to the formulation and successful
implementation of the Oregon plan. Further, it chronicles the work of the Health
Services Commission (HSC) and the business community’s involvement in the work
of that commission. In addition, the chapter delves into the political significance of the
postponement of the “employermandate” and the role Oregon businesses played in
persuading or not persuading Congress to grant Oregon a waiver. Finally, the chapter
discusses the impact of the failure of President Clinton’s health care reform on
Oregon’s health care reform plan.

The Oregon Health Plan (OHP) as originally designed is a blueprint for
universal access and affordable health coverage for Oregon’s uninsured, poor
residents. Oregon’s low- income residents were not only the unemployed, poor, or the
disabled but also included the so called “working poor,” i.e. those residents who have
employment but whose employers could not offer them health insurance. Usually, the
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majority o f employers who could not offer insurance to their employees were the
small businesses in the state.

Based on the transcripts of testimonies from the state archives and the personal
interviews that this researcher conducted, initially when the Oregon Health Plan was
being discussed the Oregon business community did not show much interest and
therefore did not actively support it. But over time their interest blossomed for reasons
various scholars would describe as business’s “self-interest” (Bergthold, 1993), Maher
(2003), and (Mintz, 1995). For example, Mintz (1995) reminds us that businesspolitical behavior depends on the micro-interests of individual firms and when it
comes to collective action, business behavior is temporary and non-enduring. This
kind of business- behavior is also noted in Swenson and Greer (2002). Swenson and
Greer (2002) posit that when it comes to health care reform, there is a “damaging shift
in position by business organizations” as exemplified by the United States Chamber of
Commerce. Swenson and Greer maintain that this situation occurs because “forces
external to the organization” make them change their position often in the health care
debate. As an example, Swenson and Greer (2003) state that “cross-lobbying” by the
National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB) is one such external force that
the Chamber of Commerce must contend with continually. As noted previously in this
research study, the NFIB represents mostly small employers and in certain crucial
matters affecting American business, the Chamber o f Commerce frequently changes
its position. The reason for this business behavior is obvious: The Chamber acquiesces
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to NFIB’s demands because the NFIB as a member of the Chamber of Commerce
could potentially threaten to cause defection of large number of its business members.
Therefore, when it is clear to small business that the chamber is not representing its
interests, it usually does not join it in a coalition to fight for certain causes. No place is
this statement more true than in Oregon’s case.
In Oregon, Associated Oregon Industries (AOI) appears to be the closest thing
that resembles a chamber of commerce for the business community. Apart from that
business association, there is no other unified body called “ Oregon Chamber of
Commerce.” Instead, different localities maintain their own Chambers of Commerce.
Flowever, when there is a cause that requires a collective action within the business
community, Oregon businesses usually will join a coalition either to support the cause
or to oppose it. That is precisely what happened with the Oregon Health Plan during
the formulation and implementation phases of the plan. For example, during the
formulation of the Oregon Health Plan, the Oregon business community raised its
suspicion when Senate Bill (SB 935) was introduced. Consequently, some business
entities in the business community were for it, others were against it. (A full
discussion of this particular bill will follow later in this chapter). However, at this
juncture, it is important to reiterate that the business community in Oregon is not
monolithic. Clearly, there are different segments and they have different interests. On
the question of the OHP, one respondent interviewed for this study put it this way:

The large businesses that are in the business of health care, hospitals
and health systems, insurers, had one perspective. The very large
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businesses like Tektronix and NW Natural, US Bank and US West they all had another perspective, and midsize businesses had even
another perspective.

The different perspectives of the Oregon business community as described by
this respondent showed up in the way the businesses lent their support for the health
plan. Originally, the business community seemed supportive of the concept of the
state having the kind of health reform that it was about to embark on beginning in
1987. This was when Senate Bill (SB27) was introduced. However, when Senate Bill
(SB935) was debated and passed, the business community gave it qualified support,
sensing that it might not survive the scrutiny of the federal government. This kind of
business approach is what Mintz (1995) has described as business -political behavior.

Not surprisingly, the politics of health care legislation in Oregon has followed
this theory o f business-political behavior as provided by Mintz (1995). In a different
study, Bergthold (1993) suggests that business leaders intervene in the public policy
process when they suspect that government will not protect their interest. This
assertion by Bergthold is consistent with Oregon’s experience with health care reform
in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The legislation that passed through the Oregon
legislature during this period were many. However, this research study will focus
mainly on those that have relevance to the subject o f this study, which is the analysis
of the role of the Oregon business community in the evolution of the Oregon Health
Plan. The pieces of legislation that were central to this study’s focus were mainly SB
27 and SB 935 - a point this researcher has previously noted in this study. However,
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between these two bills, SB 935 was the most controversial. The evolution of these
specific bills and their dynamics are discussed in the subsequent section of this
chapter.

The Evolution of the State’s insurance reform

The process for Oregon’s health insurance reform started in 1987 when Neil
Goldschmidt was the state’s governor. In that year, Oregon established an agency it
called “Insurance Pool Governing Board” (IPGB) through (HB2594). The purpose for
establishing this board was to offer the uninsured and self-employed individuals and
small businesses (1-25 employees) the opportunity to purchase small group health
insurance that is affordable to them from private companies. In the same year, Senate
Bill (SB 583) was passed by the Oregon legislature. This senate bill established the
Oregon Medical Insurance Pool (OMIP). It was designed to offer benefits to people
who could not buy individual health insurance because of their pre-existing
conditions. Although the OMIP was a quasi-public agency, the legislature provided it
with no funding (OHP Overview, 2004, p.4). Besides these two bills, not much
impacted the business community at this time and, therefore, the Oregon business
community did not have the kind of coalition that it mobilized in the 1989 legislative
session.

It was during the 1989 legislative session that the Oregon business
community’s involvement in the health reform debate started to take shape. In that
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year, the Insurance Pool Governing Board (IPGB) had made insurance available to
uninsured business in the state and offered them a tax credit for participating in the
program. During the same period, “employer mandate” was established and it was
scheduled to take effect by January 1, 1994. This employer mandate required
employers to provide medical insurance to those employees working 17.5 hours or
more per week and their dependants. For businesses unable to comply with this law,
the alternative was to pay into a special state insurance fund that offered coverage to
their employees. This special state insurance fund was established by (SB 935).

The evolution and development SB 27 and SB 935

Senate Bill (SB 27). This is the bill that created the States’ Health Services
Commission and it is also the bill that mandated that the state provide a basic level of
health care to all citizens with incomes at or below the federal poverty level (FPL)
through a reformed Medicaid program. The bill was enacted in 1989 and it provided
the foundation for the Oregon Health Plan. The bill as written contained four basic
premises:
♦ The state would be responsible for insuring legal state residents with
incomes below the federal poverty level, without regard to categorical criteria.
♦ The state would develop a prioritized list of health services (ranked
according to clinical effectiveness and social values). It directed that the scope
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of benefits would be tied explicitly to the budget process. Services above the
cut-off line would be funded; those below the line would not be covered.
♦ The state would set reimbursement rate levels sufficient to cover costs,
thereby eliminating cost shifting and increasing provider participation.
♦ The state would make an overt commitment to managed care where feasible.

Senate Bill (SB 935). This is one of the companion bills that was passed with
Senate Bill (SB 27) that allows for an “insurance pool” which established group
medical coverage for employers with 25 or fewer employees. As the Oregon health
plan included the “pay or play” option, the law required all Oregon employers with
full time employees who were then not providing their workers and their dependants
with health insurance to make a tax contribution toward their health care premium- the
“pay” option, or to directly purchase insurance for their employees and their
dependants - the “play” option. Under the then existing statute, employers electing to
pay must pay 75% of the premium cost for full time employees and 50% of the
premium cost for their dependants. The statute did not prescribe minimum
contribution standards for Oregon employers who during this time provided coverage
or elected the play option in the future.
For employers who have employees working fewer than 17.5 hours per week,
or who have temporary and seasonal employees, the law makes an exception. In
addition, under this law, new businesses were given an 18 month exemption from the
law. The statute was to take effect on March 31,1997 for employers with more than
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25 employees. For employers with 25 or fewer employees, the law was to take effect
on January 1, 1998. These dates were subject to Oregon receiving an exemption from
the federal ERISA law.
The essential feature of this bill (SB 935) is that business participation was
based on eligibility. By implication, the bill essentially targeted the small business
community since it was the small business community that did not provide insurance
to their employees. But it also required a congressional exemption to the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) before it could take effect. It is worth noting
that it was during the course o f establishing this Senate Bill that most of the debate
and business opposition emerged. The opposition came mainly from the small
business community. For example, during the debate about SB 935, Mr. John
Wilkerson, President of Oregon’s 7-Eleven Franchise Owners, testifying before the
House Human Resources Committee on May 12, 1989, stated:
At the outset I want to acknowledge that Oregon, as well as the rest of the
Country, faces the problem of a significant number of people who have no
health insurance or financial ability to obtain adequate health care. At the same
time I must tell you that Senate Bill 935 is the wrong solution and that we are
opposed to SB 935.

Mr. Wilkerson’s group was opposed to the bill for specific reasons. As he further
explained during the course of his testimony:

First, let me describe to you the economics of my business. On average, each
new 7-Eleven franchise pays a franchise fee of approximately $40,000. In
addition, each franchisee must purchase inventory, costing about $38,000.
Labor is the largest single cost in my business and in the store of my fellow
franchisees that represents approximately 74% of the cost of doing business.
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On average, we employ 10 full and part-time people in each of our stores. The
average pre-tax income of 7-Eleven franchisee is about $29, 853 per year and
is usually a family business with the spouse and sometimes, another family
member working in the store.
Mr. Wilkerson’s concern was purely based on the cost burden, which the Senate Bill
would impose on his business and those of his group. As he later added in his
testimony:

The annual budget for the federal government is over $7 trillion —and the
federal government is not able to fund universal health care. The annual
budget for the State of Oregon is over $7 billion, and the state says it cannot
afford to provide health care for those who need it. Physicians who earn an
average of more than $100,000 per year say they cannot subsidize health care
for the uninsured. So what gives anyone the idea that fellow franchisees and I
are better able to absorb the cost of providing health care? Quite simply, we
cannot.
Some of the dire predictions Mr. Wilkerson uttered in his concluding remarks
were that the bill would destroy the opportunity for many to start small businesses,
force many o f the existing small businesses to close, and deny those who the bill was
intended to help the opportunity to have employment. On the same day of Mr.
Wilkerson’s testimony, the National Federation of Independent Business of Oregon
(NFIB) also testified in opposition to SB 935. The principal reason the NFIB was
against the bill was the mandate clause in section 5 of the bill. Specifically, Section 5
read:

ORS 653.775 is amended to read:
653.775 (1) Part 1 covered [shall focus on episodic acute care and recovery
care fo r catastrophic illness or accident. The coverage ] applies to
eligible covered employees only.
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(2) The plan shall have a [deductible and high] stop loss to insure that no
employee is required to pay the costs of the deductible and other reasonable
cost-sharing requirements and that Part 1 coverage can be obtained at a low
enough cost to insure accessibility.
(3) Subject to subsection (4) of this section, employers shall pay the premium
of Part 1 coverage up to a maximum of $40 for each eligible covered employee
per month.
(4) All covered eligible employees shall participate in and be covered by at
least Part 1 coverage. An employer may require a minimum employee
contribution of not to exceed 25 percent of the premium or $15, which is
lesser, for only Part 1 coverage described in this section.
(5) Part 1 coverage shall include at least those health care services described by
section 1 o f this 1989 Act.
(6) The amount specified in this section apply only to those employers who
qualify for tax credits under ORS 316.096, 317.113 or 318. 170.

Jim Bemau who testified on behalf of the NFIB before the House Human Resources
Committee complained that SB 935 would discourage participation in the small
business health plan (HB 2594) which his group had already signed off on. As he puts
it, “many businesses will see the mandate coming and will not act until 1994”. Mr.
Bemau stated that if the mandate were deleted from the bill, his group would again be
a partner in a unified effort in expanding the access to health coverage.

There were other small business owners who also testified during this hearing.
Those who could not make it in person submitted memoranda to the committee in
opposition to the bill. By all accounts, the bill was very controversial. However, even
though the small business establishment was opposed to the bill, there were other
business groups that supported it. For example, the Associated Oregon Industries
(AOI) and the Oregon Association of Hospitals were among the many large business
interests that testified before the committee. The individual who testified on behalf of
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AOI was Karl Frederick. Mr. Frederick was the legislative director for Associated
Oregon Industries at the time. According to Mr. Frederick, “the vast majority of
Oregon employers want their workers to have access to good, affordable health care.”
He quoted Oregon Congressman Ron Wyden who previously had written an opinion
piece in AOI’s Business Viewpoint, a publication of this particular business lobby
group. Quoting Congressman Wyden, Frederick said, “It’s the morally right approach
and it’s good for business. Business can’t prosper when its most important asset- -the
employees - - are laid up.”

The business lobby group that testified before this House Human Resources
Committee of the Oregon legislature was the Oregon Association of Hospitals. Ed
Patterson, Vice-President of Government Relations for the association on May 10,
1989, gave its testimony. In his remarks to the committee, Mr. Patterson said that SB
935 is a “first step to eliminating the health care crisis in Oregon.” Mr. Patterson stated
that there is “little doubt that our system of cost shifting to finance health care for the
uninsured is beginning to collapse.” The problem of uncompensated care according to
Patterson, would lead inevitably to access limitations by hospitals and other health
systems for individuals who rely on such benevolence. In summary, Patterson and his
group voiced strong support for Senate Bill (SB 935). Appendices I and J are Inpatient
Exhibit o f graphic displays of Expense Components of a Non-Medicare/ Medicaid Bill
for 1985 and 1987 respectively in Oregon’s hospitals during these periods. The
exhibits are attachments to the testimony submitted by Mr. Patterson the committee. In

47

short, these patients’ costs problems illustrate how desperate Oregon’s hospitals were
in the period prior to the formulation of the Oregon health plan.
As a footnote, many other individuals from other business groups and
professions either testified in favor or in opposition to the bill.

For Senate Bill 27 (SB 27) there seemed to be less opposition and even the
business community seemed to be united behind this particular bill. Oregon’s major
business lobby- AOI- and the NFIB supported it, and so did non -business groups. For
example, the Oregon Health Action Campaign and Oregon’s American Federation of
Labor/Congress of International Organization (AFL/CIO) testified in support of the
bill. The Executive Director of the Oregon Health Action Campaign, Ellen Pinney, on
June 2, 1989, testified before the Senate Ways and Means committee on behalf of her
group. During her testimony she described SB 27 as a “bold and innovative beginning
to a solution of the health crisis in Oregon.” Elaborating on what she saw as health
crises she stated these statistics:
In 1986, 400,000 Oregonians had no health insurance, close to 1 in 5 of the
state’s population. 75% of the uninsured are workers and their dependents.
One third are children. The numbers are increasing as businesses which
provide 84% o f the insurance in the state, faced with premium increases of
20% last year and another 20% predicted for this year, are forced to drop
employees or their dependents from coverage
Ms. Pinney stated what she described as some positive points about SB 27. According
to her, SB 27 is the “first bill in the nation that admits Medicaid is a catastrophe and
proposes to do something about it”. The Oregon AFL/CIO also testified during this
hearing in support of SB27. According to Amy Klare, labor’s representative testifying
before the committee, the process set forth in SB 27 was a vehicle to:
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Correct the irony that three -fourths of those denied access to health care in
this
State are workers and their dependents.
Establish the population for which the state is responsible, and in doing so,
prescribe the population for which employers must be responsible
Initiate an equitable health care policy to reduce costs now being shifted to
employers and individuals who purchase health insurance, with insurance
companies using this shift to justify rate hikes.
Identify the health care services, which are most cost effective and beneficial
for the greatest number of people
Serve as the impetus for additional legislation to provide universal access to
health care for the working uninsured with insufficient personal resources to
obtain adequate health care services.

So in essence, on SB 27, there was a unified business position. Even social activists
and the labor unions were in support of this piece of legislation.

As noted previously, it was during this period that the Oregon Health Services
Commission (HSC) was created. The commission was created to develop a ranking for
medical services from the most to least important to the low- income segment of the
population. After the commission developed its list, the legislature defined the health
care package from that list.

The evolution of the work of the Health Services Commission (HSC)

This researcher noted earlier in this chapter that the governor of the State of Oregon in
1989 was Neil Goldschmidt. As governor, Mr. Goldschmidt appointed the members of
the Health Services Commission. The eleven member body was chaired by Mr.
Gregory, a timber mill entrepreneur from Glendale, Oregon. The commission had a
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membership o f five physicians, a public health nurse, a social services worker and four
health care consumers. It started its work in September 1989, and had three
subcommittees. Those subcommittees were Health Outcomes, Social values, and
Mental Health and Chemical Dependency. The great bulk of the Commission’s work
was to be performed by the Health Outcomes and Social Values Subcommittees. It
would also develop the priority list. As previously noted, the commission was charged
with the responsibility of providing the legislature with a prioritized list of health
services. This list would be generated from public hearings and research as to the
effectiveness of treatments and would be due March 1, 1990. If the federal waiver was
granted, the program would go into effect July 1, 1990. However, securing the federal
waiver was a formidable task. The task was formidable because of the “prioritization
of list” requirement that the law charged the independent commission to create. As
Thome (1997:132) observed “ No one had ever tried to prioritize the vast array of
available services before.” It is important to note that the “prioritized list” developed
by this commission could not be altered by the legislature but it “could only decide
where to draw the line”(Thome 1997: 131). Consequently, the legislature had the
authority to define the benefit package and the program’s budget.

Another important factor in the way the commission did its work was the
adoption of “cost-benefit methodology” in arriving at the decision it made as to
treatment services. With this kind of methodology, the commission considered four
factors in arriving at its decisions. The four factors were (1) Cost (2) net duration of
benefit (3) physician estimates of the likelihood that treatment could alleviate
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symptoms or prevent death, and (4) citizens’ views on the seriousness of symptoms
and functional limitations.

In February 1991, the HSC made public its first “prioritized Health Services
List”(Leichter 1997:148). As was expected, the list reflected both the current wisdom
among the medical community and many of the values expressed in the community
forums conducted by the commission. For example, on the list preventive medicine
was given a high priority. In April of that year, an independent actuary firm hired to
determine the costs and values of the different treatment options in the prioritized list
submitted its report to the commission. According to Leichter (1997), the commission
recommended to the Oregon legislature to fund a benefit package that included at least
all “essential” services and most “very important services.” As reported in the list,
essential services were in categories one through nine in the seventeen -category list.
Consequently, on June 30 1991, the Oregon legislature approved a budget that
included an additional $33 million for the Medicaid program. This legislative action
allowed the state to add 78,000 new Medicaid recipients and thereby extend health
services to them through line 587 out o f 705 condition/treatment pairs. With funding
now secured, the state needed federal approval to implement the plan.

Business community’s involvement with the work of HSC

As previously noted, the Chairman of the independent commission appointed
to develop the prioritized list was a businessman. It also included five physicians who
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as a matter of course were “small businessmen” in the context of the American health
care environment (Starr, 1982). On August 19,1991, Oregon requested a waiver from
the federal government so that it could implement a demonstration project built around
the principle of universal access to a basic package of health care services. In late
1992, twenty national organizations representing persons with disabilities publicly
urged President George Bush not to grant the waiver. Consequently, on August 3,
1992, Secretary of Department of Human Services Louis Sullivan informed the State
of Oregon that he would not grant the waiver because the state’s plan was in conflict
with Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990 (Fox and Leichter, 1993). In
particular, the Secretary mentioned the statewide survey in which Oregonians rated
various health situations and concluded in the survey that the value of a person’s life
with a disability is less than the value of a person’s life without a disability (Ota,
1992).

In consultation with federal officials, the Oregon Health Services Commission
responded to the waiver rejection by revising the methodology for the list. With the
ascendancy o f Bill Clinton to the presidency, Oregon finally was granted the waiver it
had sought for so long. This was in 1993 and the Oregon legislature at this time had in
the House of Representatives a Republican majority. Although Democrats still
controlled the Oregon Senate and the Governor’s office, things were not the same any
more. As Thome (1997:134) indicated, when the approved waiver was brought to the
legislature in 1993, “Oregon lawmakers began to back off from their commitment to
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universal coverage.” Although they eventually funded the Medicaid expansion, the
Medicaid changes became tied up with the debate on “employer mandate” - an issue
that basically had divided the employer community. It is worth noting that it was this
issue that was one of the major reasons the Oregon legislature had a marathon session
in 1993. By the time the 1993 session was adjourned, the Medicaid plan was funded
but the employer mandate was delayed with a statutory requirement that if a
congressional exemption from Employment Income Security Act (ERISA) was not
obtained by January 2 1996, the mandate would expire automatically. Ultimately, that
was exactly what happened. According to Leichter (1997), the mandate was initially
intended to take effect in 1995 and because of legislation passed in 1993, its effective
date was delayed to 1997 or 1998 depending on the number of workers employed by a
business (p. 141). The statutory language inserted into the bill to let the mandate expire
if congress did not grant the exemption by a certain date was a political compromise
between the state and the business community. After this compromise was reached,
business opposition to the mandate softened.

Other Bills relevant to the implementation of the Oregon health plan (OHP).

Another important bill that was passed in 1989 (i.e., the year SB 935 was
enacted into law) was Senate Bill 534 (SB 534). This bill provided a funding
mechanism for the State agency that was created in 1987 by Senate Bill 583 (SB583).
That agency, the Oregon Medical Insurance Pool (OMIP), offer a health insurance for
people who could not buy insurance coverage for themselves due to pre-existing
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medical conditions. While the debate for the SB 935 amendment was going on in
1989, a framework for phase 1 of the OHP Medicaid demonstration developed in the
context of SB 27.

In 1991, Barbara Roberts became governor of Oregon and that same year
several insurance reforms were legislated including a guaranteed-issue policy that all
small -business insurance carriers in Oregon must offer. To elaborate, guaranteed
issue meant that as a condition of doing business in the state, insurance carriers under
SB 1076 were required to make available to small employers an approved basic health
plan with benefits that were “substantially similar” to those provided in the Medicaid
“Demonstration” portion of the Oregon Health Plan. Also, the insurance carriers
could offer additional health benefit plans as options on an accept or reject basis but
the Guaranteed issue plan must be offered when optional plans were rejected. Under
SB 152, all health benefits plans offered by an insurance earner or a Multiple
Employer Welfare Arrangement (MEWA) must be marketed and offered on the same
guaranteed issue basis as required for the basic health benefits plans. In addition,
MEWAs and other professional insurance/ trade associations established to provide
health care benefits must accept any individual who applies for coverage and who
meets membership requirements. There are other provisions under SB 1076 not
elaborated on here because it is the judgment o f the researcher that those provisions
are not relevant to the discussion being carried on in this study.
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To a large extent, the centerpiece of the business community’s involvement in
the OHP had been SB 935 and to some extent SB 27. Due to the controversial nature
of the “employer mandate,” its full implementation was postponed until July 1,1995,
with the enactment of (SB 1076). In pursuing these small business insurance reforms,
the Oregon legislature recognized that eighty-six per cent (86%) of all Oregon workers
who were not offered health insurance by their employers work in firms with fewer
than 25 employees. This acknowledgement provided the impetus for the legislature to
enact SB 1076 which went into effect in 1993. As it happened, SB 1076 was designed
to level the playing field for small business employers by mandating reforms in the
underwriting, rating and marketing policies of health benefits. In 1993, the small
business insurance went on sale. In the same year, the employer mandate was
postponed until March 31, 1997, with HB 5530.

In 1995, John Kitzhaber became governor o f Oregon and in the following year,
the employer mandate was repealed. It was repealed because Congress did not grant
an exemption the State wanted from the provisions of the Employment Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) by the deadline the State had sought.
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The political significance of the postponement of “employer mandate” and the
role business oreanizations played in persuading Congress not to grant Oregon a
waiver
A number o f states as well as the national government have considered
employer mandates as one of the many means of financing universal coverage. Under
an employer mandate, employers are required to contribute toward the health
insurance costs o f eligible employees. In Oregon, the employer mandate and small
business insurance programs were separate from the Medicaid demonstration and they
were deemed very important for the success of Oregon’s health care reform efforts.
The waiver cost estimate for the Medicaid program assumed that Medicaid
beneficiaries who were employed would shift to employer coverage by February 1997,
but this did not happen as planned. The problem was that even before the effective
date for the implementation o f the mandate, the ERISA controversy had scuttled the
law.
The failure o f the mandate had a political history. From 1989 through 1996, the
state’s political landscape had changed. For example, in 1989, Democrats controlled
both houses o f the legislature as well as the governorship. Oregon’s Senate President
John Kitzhaber and Vera Katz, Speaker of the State’s Flouse of Representatives were
powerful allies. Both left the legislature the same time -in 1991. Moreover, the
Democrats lost control of the House in 1990 and emerged from November 1992
elections with a slim majority in the Senate. Meanwhile, no one had emerged to fill
the leadership vacuum Kitzhaber’s departure had created on the Oregon Health Plan’s
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implementation. In addition, during this period, bipartisan support for the Oregon plan
was eroding. Not only was this a problem, but one-third of the members of the 1993
Legislative Assembly had no personal investment in or experience with the plan.
Before this time, in the 1991 legislative session, the employer mandate had been
postponed until July 1, 1995, with (SB 1076).

The weakening of legislative support was exacerbated by apparent disarray
among its allies outside the legislature. For example, at the beginning of the 1993
legislative session, Governor Roberts proposed raising most of the funds to implement
the health plan through a health provider tax. That tax was to be 1.5 percent on gross
hospital revenue, 0.9 percent on physicians and dentists, and also increased cigarette
taxes. Both proposals -a tax on hospital revenues and a tax on physicians and dentists,
were opposed by such original supporters of the health plan as the Oregon Medical
Association and the Association of Oregon Industries (AOI). In particular, the Oregon
Medical Association (OMA) opposed the provider tax and the AOI opposed both taxes
(i.e., the provider tax and the cigarette tax). In the midst of all these, the employer
mandate was postponed again until March 31, 1997 (HB 5530).

The AOI is the State’s major business lobby and at this time, it had become a
serious obstacle to the health plan’s implementation. According to Fox and Leichter
(1993), the organization accused the state of reneging on two promises. One was that
the plan was to be financed through general funds, not special taxes that could be
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passed back to employers in the form of higher insurance premiums. The other
promise was that the waiver conditions the state accepted prevented it from reducing
the basic benefits package. This situation according to AOI was inconsistent with the
law’s original intent, which was that the state should adjust benefits in line with its
financial situation. But the most important element of all these gradual retreats was
the additional or potential threat of the “employer mandate.” Many members of AOI
were from the small business community. The original law provided that once the
waivers were obtained to cover the Medicaid population, employers would be required
to either offer their employees a benefits package substantially similar to that
established by the Health Services Commission (HSC) or to pay into a state insurance
fund pool, which would be used to subsidize alternative insurance programs for
uninsured workers and their dependents. As originally conceived in the law, all these
were to happen by July 1995.

It is important to note that during this uneasy period the business community,
the state’s small business leaders and some legislators also worried that after the playor-pay mandate went into effect, some low-wage workers would be shifted from
Medicaid to employer -provided or subsidized insurance, thereby putting a new
financial burden on small businesses. Politically, the postponement and /or rescinding
of the employer mandate would not have invalidated the federal waiver, but it could
have made staying within the Health Care Finance Administration expenditure cap
difficult. Roger Auerbach, Governor Roberts’ adviser on health care issues
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commented that the mandate was “a major policy issue because we need to hold
everybody together in support of the plan if we are to achieve our goal of getting this
Medicaid expansion plan financed” (Mackenzie, 1993: D02). Despite these political
maneuverings, the employer mandate was eventually repealed in 1996 because of the
failure of the state to get the exemption from Congress regarding the ERISA law.
From the look of things, business was reluctant to support the mandate even though
strategically, it seemed to embrace it. Politically, the fact that there was a health
benefits mandate was sufficient for business not to be actively supportive. For
example, Oregon businesses are philosophically conservative; they tended to align
more with the Republican politics than Democratic Party politicians. Not surprisingly,
one lobbyist interviewed for this study had this to say:

They don’t like the idea of mandates and like my group for example...
I’m the executive director of now. Individually, for example, almost all
of them provide mental health benefits but collectively they oppose a
mental health mandate and it’s anything that gets mandated they tend to
oppose and so that was a big part of it
From the research, it is not clear what role the Oregon business organizations
played in persuading Congress not to grant Oregon the exemption that it needed. What
is clear, however, is that the Oregon business community was not very enthusiastic
about the mandate. For example, one political executive interviewed for this study
commented about a rumor that circulated around Salem at that critical time in
reference to the employer mandate. The rumor was that then Governor Barbara
Roberts once walked into a room where House Speaker Larry Campbell and Senate
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President Bill Bradbury were having a meeting during the last few days of the 1993
legislative session arguing what to do about the waiver application regarding the
employer mandate and said to these two legislators, “You guys need a mother. You
need to come to some agreement.” Shortly afterwards, an agreement was struck
according to this respondent. The respondent said that in the agreement that was
struck, the business community as represented by AOI got what it wanted without
having to specifically say they killed the employer mandate. According to this
respondent, it was the language that specifically said “we have to request a waiver of
ERISA from congress” before the mandate would take effect. The agreement also
explicitly stated that if the exemption was not granted by congress before a certain
date, i.e. by January 2 1996, the agreement was null and void. This respondent
maintained that:

Everybody knew we weren’t going to be able to get the waivers. But it was a
way for AOI to say, “Oh, we didn’t kill this.” The state just couldn’t get the
waivers so every one was able to save face.

This respondent further commented:

So, I think that all of these things, AOI as a business was very supportive of
this in the beginning but then when it came time for business to do their part,
was not willing to support that.
(Interviewed by author, December 5, 2003).
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This attitude and or business behavior mirrored closely what was taking place
at the national level at the time. For example, in a study published in Management
Accounting (USA) 1993, Susan Jayson indicated that nationally, business’s mood
about employer mandate was that it would hurt business financially and so it was not
enthusiastic of its prospects. In discussing business attitudes toward the Clinton health
care plan, Jayson (1993) stated that Buck Consultants, an employee benefits,
actuarial, and consulting firm monitored the reaction of representatives from Fortune
500 companies and found that more than half (54%) of the panelists they talked with
said that in general, “mandated health care benefits” would hurt their organizations.
Specifically, these panelists argued that a payroll tax to fund national health care
would result in decreased medical benefit levels (75%) and other employee benefit
reductions (47%). Thirty-five percent believed that it would reduce employment.
When the question became: what would these panelists prefer? The answer was that
the status quo should be maintained.
It is worth noting that during this national debate, small companies that did not
offer medical benefits to their employees predicted that the Clinton plan would
devastate their bottom lines. Some business entrepreneurs said that the burden of the
mandate would slow hiring, force salary reductions, and lead to business failures
(Jayson, 1993). Jayson (1993) even quoted Jack Faris, president of 600,000 -member
National Federation of Independent Business at the time who agreed with the
assessment of the small business companies. According to Jayson (1993), Faris
predicted that there would be a loss of as many as 1.5 million private jobs.
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Furthermore, Jayson quoted Faris as saying, “small business payrolls have little
elasticity to accommodate higher costs associated with employee benefits.”
It is important to recognize that what went on at this time at the national level
was also going on at the state level. The parallelism is that the issues and concerns that
divided the business community at the national level also were the same issues and
concerns that divided them at the state level. The range of concerns business had
whether at the state level or national level made it difficult for the waiver process. This
is so because the politics of the waiver process has many dimensions. On the one
hand, there is the executive branch and the legislative branch of government at the
federal level. On the other hand there is the industry group which as a collective does
what has been described as “cross-lobbying” to these two branches of government.
For instance, the White House and the Office of Management and Budget get lobbied
by industry groups from time to time. At the same time, Congress also gets lobbied on
the same issues by the same groups. Whenever these situations arise, the immediate
practical problems that states must contend with in the context of health care reform
become difficult to resolve. The difficulty becomes much more problematic when
Congress assumes a more active role in establishing specific boundaries for state
waiver activities. The ERISA issue demonstrated how congressional and executive
branches of government made the waiver process difficult for Oregon. Consequently,
due to congressional and White House inflexibility with the ERISA requirement,
Oregon’s lawmakers, through the sunset provision written in the law establishing the
employer mandate in the Oregon Health Plan, had to repeal that mandate.
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In summary, of all the bills passed in the Oregon legislature leading up to the
evolution and implementation of the Oregon Health Plan, a few bills had real impact
on Oregon’s business community. Those few bills, namely SB 935 and SB 27, became
mainly the centerpiece o f the Oregon business community’s involvement in the
formulation and implementation of the health plan. Basically, they were the ones that
generated the most interest either for or against in their support for the Oregon Health
Plan (OHP) besides the employer mandate.

The impacts of the failure of Clinton’s health care plan on Oregon’s health care
reform.
The failure of Clinton’s health reform in the 1990’s impacted what was going
on in Oregon in that particular era. For instance, during the early of 1990’s, the
country appeared on the verge of supporting comprehensive health care reform. Also,
in the same period of the 1990s managed care was just exploding. By the time the
mandate was officially turned down, the Clinton plan had failed. In Oregon,
everyone’s attention was on managed care. With managed care, it was hoped that the
cost of care was going to be dramatically lower and Oregon employers were
celebrating because the cost o f health care was the lowest it had been in 15 years. The
problem is that with the emergence of managed care, many citizens were confused
about what managed care was and what was the Oregon Health Plan. Some in the
Oregon business community were equally confused. Consequently, the failure of
Clinton’s plan became a major setback for the Oregon plan. However, what should not
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be forgotten is that Oregon and Dr. Kitzhaber started their health reform program
before President Clinton began his health care refonn effort.
The Oregon Health Plan and managed care were not dependent on each other.
They just happened to co-exist at the same time. Fortuitously, managed care ended up
making the Oregon Health Plan work more effectively, but at same time it also ended
up in large part doing it in. It stopped working in the sense that some of the early
participants in the managed care program in Oregon ceased accepting enrollees when
their reimbursements were slashed because of cost control measures initiated by the
state.
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Chapter 5

National Significance of Oregon’s Approach to Health Care Reform

In the period Oregon was initiating and implementing its health care reform,
health care in Oregon received intense national media scrutiny. Julnes and Mason
(1989) indicate that starting with the transplant funding controversy and the passage of
Senate Bill 27, such diverse publications as The Dallas Morning News, Los Angeles
Times. The New York Times, The Boston Globe, The Village Voice and a host of
other national publications carried opinion pieces on Oregon’s health care refonn
program. They add that some national broadcast media such as McNeil/Lehrer News
Hour, Night-Line. GoodMoming America, and Larry King Live ran stories of
Oregon’s initiative in their programs. In addition, specialty publications such as The
New England Journal o f Medicine, HealthWeek, and The Physician also ran stories
of Oregon’s bold experiment with health care reform. It is therefore the researcher’s
contention that this particular health policy innovation in Oregon has national
significance when it is considered within the framework of what was going on in
many other states at the time and the overall national debate regarding health care in
the United States.
Julnes and Mason (1989) state that there are two perspectives in health care
reform. According to them, one perspective is “comprised of national solutions to the
health care dilemma” (p. 5). This approach is articulated in terms of expansions of
Medicaid or adoption of a Canadian-style health care system. The other perspective
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comes from the state level. Some states such as Massachusetts used the tax code to
advance its reform effort. It mandated health care insurance for all frill-time employees
in the State. Massachusetts’ plan also established an insurance pool to cover the
otherwise uninsured. The State of Washington established a pilot project to give
coverage to as many as 30,000 uninsured individuals by contracting with prepaid
health insurance plans. Numerous other states were either looking at ways to expand
and vary their respective Medicaid programs or they already had done so.
Chapter 5 therefore examines how Oregon’s approach to healthcare reform is
similar and/or different to what happened in other states during the period of the late
1980s and early 1990s. In particular, the chapter focuses on three states that
underwent healthcare reforms but with different approaches. For this effort, three
states - Massachusetts, Florida, and Hawaii are di scussed. None of the three ever used
Oregon’s unique approach, which in some sense was revolutionary.
The researcher begins the discussion by first narrating a brief historical account
of each o f these States’ health reform programs spanning the period this research
effort is focused on. The researcher’s period o f interest for this study was noted earlier
in Chapter 3 and subsequently has been reiterated in this chapter as well. Following is
the order of the States for purposes of the discussion.
Massachusetts
The major healthcare reform in Massachusetts in the 1980s was the
Massachusetts Health Security Act o f 1988. In 1988, Michael Dukakis was still the
Governor of the state although by that time, he had gotten deeply involved with
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Presidential politics - having been nominated the Democratic Presidential candidate
for President. The Massachusetts’ Health Security Act of 1988 as it was designed
promised to every resident in Massachusetts “access to affordable health care by
1992” (Goldberger, 1990:857). This precedent -setting legislation in Massachusetts
had its detractors prior to passage. Although the Massachusetts business community
was a major force in passing the legislation, the coalition it had built several years
earlier that eventually helped to lay the groundwork for the passage of the legislation
had gradually begun to fracture. The fracturing became more intense when Governor
Dukakis introduced the bill that included new mandates without adequate
consideration for the business community’s needs. As Goldberger (1990:875) noted:
“The business groups had expected significant accommodations of their member’s
interests in exchange for their unprecedented acceptance of new employer mandates,
but felt they got none in the Governor’s bill.” Instead of accommodating their
interests, they saw the Governor appeasing the hospitals and consumer interests at the
expense of other business entities.
The accommodation Governor Dukakis made to the hospital community was
to loosen the cap on hospital charge increases from 1 percent cap above inflation that
had been promised to business to 2 percent above inflation. This affront to the
business community notwithstanding, Dukakis also reached accommodation with
consumer groups. He added language to the proposed legislation banning the sale of
insurance policies with pre-existing conditions exclusions on coverage. He made
these concessions to consumer groups despite business protests. Hitherto, businesses
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had been grumbling that the benefits package in the bill was already too rich and that
the move to universal coverage was getting too hasty. At this point, insurers
concurred with the notion that the cost to business had become unacceptably high.
Furthermore, they felt that their particular concerns were not addressed.
At these critical moments, the Governor’s concessions to hospitals were not
enough to mollify the hospitals even though that was costing him the support o f the
larger business community. Consequently, the hospitals launched a massive lobbying
campaign intent on derailing the bill. With the business community unhappy with the
way the bill was shaping up, it also launched its own campaign similar to the hospitals
own campaign to kill this “costly bill”. In particular, organizations representing small
businesses whose members would bear the brunt of the new mandates, stepped up
their opposition. Despite all this bickering, the bill finally passed the legislature with
the narrowest of margins. This came about after the bill had been watered down
considerably from what Dukakis had originally proposed.
Florida
As pressure for healthcare reform began to intensify in the 1980’s, Florida was
equally eager to establish itself as a state where healthcare reform was a major public
policy concern. While in 1988, Massachusetts became the first state to legislate a
state-wide play-or-pay plan, in 1984 Florida enacted the nation’s first state-based
revenue assessment on hospitals to create a trust fund to finance the expansion of the
state’s Medicaid program and the expansion of Primary Care Services. The revenue
assessment on hospitals, also known as the ‘Sick Tax’, was designed to fund the
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Medicaid and Primary Care Services in response to the state’s recognition that the
tribulations of the state’s uninsured required significant action by the State of Florida.
The genesis of Florida’s action was that in the early 1980’s hospital charges were
getting out of control. For that reason, both the organized elderly and business
coalitions of Florida decided to petition the state’s legislature for relief through some
kind of state regulation. In their effort doing this, both o f these groups targeted the
hospitals for government intervention. During this period of cost-control euphoria, 40
percent o f Florida’s hospitals had become for-profit, according to Brown (1993). To
make matters worse, the for-profits allegedly were shirking their fair share of the
state’s sizeable burden of uncompensated care. As Brown (1993:10), quoting one
observer from an interview noted, “a two-class system o f care was developing in
Florida and everyone knew it.” According to Brown, this one observer stated that the
“for-profits hospitals would give the uninsured guy who showed up in the ER fifteen
dollars for a taxi and send him to the nearest public hospital” (Ibid).

Given what was going on both the voluntary agency hospitals and public
hospitals pressed their case against the for-profits and demanded fiscal relief from the
state. In 1983, a task force was appointed on competition and consumer choice. This
task force was headed by former Senator Bob McKnight. Following its appointment,
the task force started drafting a blue rint for statewide policy changes. As it was doing
its job, the task force quickly became a center for citizen group presentations,
ventilating issues of concern to the press and the public. Ultimately, the task force
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made its recommendations to the Florida legislature. The legislature after receiving
the recommendations debated and negotiated a settlement by a complex bargaining
strategy that blended benefits with costs in ways that gave all major participants some
measure of victory.
The political style that resulted in this compromise is summed up in the
following comments attributed to Gary J. Clarke - an important figure in the 1992
reform. As Brown (1993:10) noted:
The provisions of the Law reflect both the comprehensive nature of the
approach as well as the compromises and consensus of all concerned.
Businesses were assured an upper limit on hospital cost increases but were left
free to negotiate their own best deals with hospitals. Hospitals escaped the
dreaded burdens of either full-fledged budget/rate regulation or mandated
charity requirements. Voluntary hospitals, and especially public hospitals were
guaranteed that their increased burden o f Medicaid care would be relieved in
direct proportion to the amount of such care they provide - more than
offsetting the increased tax to which they were subjected. Advocates for the
poor and Medicaid program expansion were able to increase overall revenue
by at least a third, without resorting to any apparent increase in direct citizen
taxation (sales or income tax). And issues that were too complicated or for
which there was insufficient time were left for further study. As the 38 to 0
and 122 to 0 votes in the Senate and House respectively demonstrate, the hardfought program was in the end supported by all interested parties in the state,
and most legislators and lobbyists (except those from some individual
hospitals) left the Capital that spring well pleased with their efforts.
The political style of negotiation as summarized by Gary Clarke first worked
for Florida in 1984, and again in 1992. The 1984 Health Access Act had among other
provisions a Public Medical Assistance Trust Fund. This was initially sustained by a
tax of 1 percent of net hospital operating revenues and rising to 1.5 percent in
subsequent years. With the new law, Florida envisioned that it would get at least $200
million dollars annually since its Medicaid Federal Matching rate was 56 percent at
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the time. With these additional new monies, it would expand and improve Medicaid
and Primary Care Services in the state. However, time, reality and circumstances
challenged Florida’s innovation of 1984. As time progressed in the 1980s the
innovations of 1984 did not enable the state to improve markedly its payments to
physicians and hospitals. However, other developments were occurring as well in that
period and they adversely impacted the progress of this piece of legislation. The
Trust-Fund-assisted payments to providers increased as the program’s enrollment
doubled between 1985-1991. Consequently, overall spending for the program soared.
A few events of the era unleashed these intractable trends: The recession of
the later 1980, swelled the ranks of the unemployed, the uninsured and those on
Welfare. With new Federal mandates, new groups were added to the program. New
immigration to Florida did not help matters it exacerbated the situation. As Brown
(1993:11) observed, “various pathologies (Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome
(AIDS), drug abuse, mental illness and others) got medicalized and Medicaidized” and
the consequence of these emerging situations was increased utilization of services.
Florida, being a state that has tourism as one of its main industries, added jobs
in this period but the jobs were created in an industry that did not as a matter of its
business circumstance extend health care coverage to it workers. Programs like
Medicare and Medicaid reacted by shifting costs as their fiscal plight worsened. As
business saw its health care spending grow, so did its cry for help from the Florida
legislature. Anxiety among the elderly grew as the cost of care grew. Uncompensated
care became more burdensome for hospitals and other health systems even with the
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trust fund in place. Suspicions grew about unnecessary medical treatment and services
being provided by the medical-industrial complex of Florida. As a result of all of
these situations, voices rose in every comer of the state that something needed to be
done to bring some measure of control to the chaotic situation.
Eventually, in July 1989, the Florida legislature created two multi-member task
forces - one on Private-sector Health Care Responsibilities and the other on
Government Financed Health Care. These two task forces were required to report
their findings to the legislature by March 1991. In conclusion, the issues for health
care reform in Florida seem to mirror what happened in Oregon during the same era:
unemployment, bad economy, cost-shift, uncompensated care and rising healthcare
costs. The business community of Florida got into the act to tackle these problems
with the state’s legislature out of concern of how the situation was affecting it
financially.
Another development added impetus to this scenario. By 1990, an activist exSenator, Lawton Chiles had wrestled control of the governorship from Republican
Governor Bob Martinez and from that time on, Florida’s process of reform continued
toward its goal o f universal coverage, the same goal that the Oregon Health Plan has
envisioned from its inception. Throughout the process, the business community in
Florida was very active in the reform effort. However, its participation was to protect
its own “economic interest” just as other business communities in most other states
had tried to do.
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Hawaii
In most of the United States of America, the State of Hawaii is known among
health policy analysts as a pioneer in state health policy innovation. This distinction
has earned the State the nickname “the health state.” Neubauer (1997:166) in “Hawaii:
The Health Care State Revisited” stated: “For the most of continental America,
Statehood is but a dim aspect of its received history. For those living in Hawaii, it is a
recent and important experience. She added that for Hawaiians, statehood has
historically been associated with their moral commitment to a tradition of political
liberalism. This political philosophy fostered an atmosphere in which Hawaii’s State
leaders were able to take bold initiatives in reforming their health care system in ways
no other state had thought of years before.
Starting in 1974, when Hawaii enacted its Prepaid Health Care Act, to 1989
when it enacted its State Health Insurance Program (SHIP), to 1994 when it came up
with another refonn by implementing its HealthQuest program, the State o f Hawaii
has played a leading role in State health policy reform. Part of the reason the State of
Hawaii has been able to succeed in these efforts is that its leaders have been strong
believers in the role o f government to solve society’s social problems when market
forces alone cannot be trusted to deal with them. Another important point to make is
that since Hawaii became a State in this country, and including the time it started its
health reform programs, the State had been overwhelming a Democratic Party State.
As a matter of fact, in some political circles, the state has been described as a “One
Party State” because of its Democratic Party leanings.
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Although Hawaii has for long been in the forefront of State health policy
innovation, something very remarkable happened in Hawaii in 1986 that influenced
the intensity and direction of further reform the State later had to embark on in the late
1980s. The ‘remarkable’ thing that happened was the rise of John Waihee in 1986. In
November of that particular year, John Waihee, a native Hawaiian, a graduate of
University of Hawaii Law School, and a major player in Hawaii’s last constitutional
convention in 1978, was elected the Governor of Hawaii. Following his election as
governor, Mr. Waihee was determined to make his mark on Hawaii’s history by
initiating new and bold governmental action in the area of Hawaii’s health policy. In
his effort to accomplish this goal, he appointed Dr. John Lewin, a physician who had
practiced medicine in Hawaii for about ten years, to head his Department of Health.
Dr. Lewin subsequently led the department’s effort to shepherd the governor’s agenda
in the process of passing the State Health Insurance Program (SHIP) ini 989. In a
sense, SHIP was a major legislative achievement of the governor and one that the
history of its adoption would always be associated with the era of his leadership.
Despite this accomplishment, some observers of Hawaii’s health policy scene
state that SHIP was not comprehensive enough to deal with the population it was
aimed at. When it was designed, SHIP was supposed to cover individuals who were
uninsured by public or private health care coverage programs and who were at the low
end of the states income levels, but could not access existing health care coverage due
to a variety of other factors. This group was sometimes described as the “gap group.”
According to Neubauer (199:34) the size of this group when SHIP was passed “was
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estimated at 30,000 to 35,000.” Originally, SHIP was a temporary program, a “hand
up” for those in need most of whom it was assumed would become eligible through
employment coverage under the Prepaid Health Insurance Act of 1974. However,
things did not quite work out this way as many people had hoped. The reality
according to Neubauer (1993) is that SHIP enrollment ballooned much more than the
30,000 to 35,000 that was estimated at the beginning of the program. In the words of
Neubauer (1993:35) “ Splitting the differences in estimates, one may be left with the
reality o f 50,000 uninsured persons in the state and the policy of uncompensated care
they represent.”
Neubauer (1997) states that the prevalence o f this “gap group” was caused in
part by the structural changes in the economy. The increased number of workers not
covered by the provisions of the Prepaid Health Insurance Act, especially part-time
workers, made the situation especially important for the type of legislative action
embodied in the SHIP Act. According to Neubauer (1993) SHIP lasted from its
introduction in 1990 until almost twenty thousand of its members were absorbed into
Quest in August 1994.
By every account, it can be argued that SHIP was a big program for a State as
small as Hawaii. For that reason, its limited success was unique. It was unique not
because of its presumed universality (that did not eventually happen), but rather for
“its combination of elements of universality, comprehensive care and attention to
prevention,” Neubauer (1997, p. 172). In addition, it was also a unique program
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because it laid the groundwork for the next ‘big thing’ in Hawaii’s health care reform
agenda.
Hawaii’s next program for health care reform was its HealthQUEST,
implemented in 1994. Hawaii’s HealthQUEST was a capitated, managed care program
that served many of the former Medicaid recipients and all of SHIP’s. It shifted
publicly funded health care insurance from an entitlement structure to an insurancebased system. It emphasized cost control within the conventional structure of managed
health care plans that already had dominated Hawaii’s health care market.
Before HealthQEfEST, or HawaiiQUEST, as it was sometimes called, came
into being, there was a general realization among the residents of Hawaii that various
components and key participants in Hawaii’s overall health care system lacked
integration. This general concern became the impetus for the Governor, who was
already known for his passion for health care refonn, to spring into action.
Consequently, in 1990, governor John Waihee appointed a Governor’s Blue Ribbon
Panel on Health Care. This panel was directed to develop a more comprehensive
health care system through widespread community consultation. It was also directed to
develop recommendations to facilitate more effective cost control measures and the
delivery of health care.
Although there was general agreement that the Prepaid Health Care Act and
the combination of coverage established by SHIP have been of great benefit to the
people of Hawaii, the State’s lawmakers were convinced there were some
inadequacies in those existing programs. For example, such things like Community
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Nursing Program, and the Certificate -Of-Need (CON) process were not addressed
within the existing program. Also, what to do with the increasing elderly population, a
growing shortage of certain health care workers, acute and long-term bed shortages,
escalating health care costs, and the cost shifting from uncompensated care were
among the shortcomings of the existing system.
Membership on the Blue Ribbon panel consisted of a cross-section of Hawaii’s
economic and social elites. These economic and social elites included business
representatives, insurance providers, consumers, and academia. After several months
of public hearings and deliberation, the panel made its recommendations in July 1992.
According to Neubauer (1993), the number of recommendation they made was thirtysix of which they designated eight as “Key change” proposals. In broad, general terms,
the recommendations focused on five areas: administrative costs, health care
resources, medicals costs, consumer expectations, and cost shifting. The
implementation of some of the changes proposed by this panel ran into some strong
opposition by the business community. Most of its opposition was based on the fact
that an “entity” would be created to implement the recommendations which they saw
as another “increment of public sector regulation” (Neubauer 1993:37). However, the
labor community in Hawaii saw it differently. Labor’s point of view was that without
a strong governmental authority, none of the recommendations would come to
fruition, hence its support for the creation of the separate entity to implement the
recommendations. The State governments view in all this was simple: The creation of
the new entity would signal a further commitment of the State to “partnership” in the
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development of quasi-cooperative, quasi-regulatory approaches to health care system
development and cost control, according to Neubauer (1993).

Despite all these protestations, the Blue Ribbon Panels work did not result in a
legislative victory. Neubauer (1993:37) speculated that the “failure to act legislatively
resulted from a breakdown in the political coalition that supported both SHIP and the
panel.” Neubauer explained this coalition as consisting of Jim Shon who was Chair of
the House Health Committee, Dr. Lewin, the Director of the Health Department who
was increasingly out of town because of his involvement with President Clinton’s
Health Care Task Force, and others on the board who originally were strong
supporters of the administrative proposals, but later became reluctant partners when
the political coalition started to crumble. In particular, State Representative Jim Shon
lost his Chairmanship of the House Health Committee due to a sweeping
reorganization of the House prior to 1993. According to Neubauer (1993), the new
committee chair, Representative Julie Duldulao, was either unwilling or unable to
forge a new coalition to support health reform. Despite these developments, in 1994,
the State of Hawaii enacted a new health care reform called HealthQuest. The
enactment of this health reform program has been noted earlier in this section.
According to Neubauer (1997), HealthQuest, which some times is referred to
as HawaiiQuest, was a product of external consultants who were working with
Hawaii’s Department of Human Services. The Department of Human Services
administered the Medicaid program. When HealthQuest was being formulated, only
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minimal input was sought from the legislature, the Department of Health or the
community. By the time this program was brought to the attention of the legislature
for ratification, it was essentially a done deal. At that point in time, the legislature had
the choice of either playing a spoiler role, or going along with its ratification. It chose
the later.
HealthQuest revamped Hawaii’s two previous health reform programs, Prepaid
Health Care Act (Prepaid) and SHIP. As mentioned earlier in this section, it shifted
publicly funded health care insurance from an entitlement structure to an insurancebased system. It also combined recipients of Medicaid and those on general assistance
including families with dependent children and SHIP into a large purchasing pool.
This new configuration was then bid to private health plans that provided a common
benefit package at a capitated rate. As Neubauer (1997:179) indicated, HawaiiQuest
continued thus the “Hawaii practice of providing a “rich” benefit package for
Medicaid recipients, with former SHIP recipients gaining increased benefits, including
increased numbers of physician visits and hospital stays.” The plan was meant not to
incur costs greater than those of the fee-for-service system that it replaced.
In conclusion, Hawaii’s 1994 HealthQuest and its earlier reform programs such
as SHIP (1989) and the Prepaid Health Insurance Act of 1974 were major examples of
how publicly supported health programs could be administered and delivered in this
country. As a pioneer in State health policy innovation, Hawaii set the stage for other
states like Oregon, Massachusetts and Florida to become big players in the State
health reform movement.

79

Lessons learned from these states.
The lessons learned from discussing these state programs is that when it comes
to health care reform, there are some similarities and differences between states on
how they conduct their health care innovations. Although not all states are discussed
in this research study, the researcher focused on three specific states to demonstrate
how what happened in Oregon might have had national significance. For example,
Oregon’s health care reform, which was personified in the Oregon Flealth Plan based
most of the conditions that led to the enactment of laws enabling reforms in all these
other states. The one constant in these state innovations is the eventual goal of
universal access, even though that goal is still elusive.
Another similarity is that in each of the states, the business community played
a pivotal role during the formulation and eventual implementation of the State
program, even though at times it was a reluctant partner. For example, in Florida,
Paul-Shaheen (1998) indicates that individuals representing Associated Industries of
Florida, the Florida League of Hospitals, the Florida Medical association, seven
insurance companies, and Blue Cross-Blue Shield o f Florida formed a lobbying group
that was highly instrumental in working out the final compromise on the Health Care
Reform Act of 1992. In Oregon’s case AOI, with a membership that included
businesses with a health- related focus, was also very much involved in the early
stages of the formulation and implementation of the health plan.
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Another important similarity in these states’ health reform program is the role
of legislative leadership and the states’ bureaucracy in these reforms. Paul-Shaheen
(1998) also noted this in her work. As she puts it: “The support of these individuals the major gate keepers o f states’ policy agenda - was critical for moving the process
forward” (p. 347). According to Paul-Shaheen, in Massachusetts, Representative John
McDonough credited Mr. Charles Flarity as absolutely critical to Massachusetts’
reform effort. Mr. Flarity was a Democratic State Representative and at the time of
Massachusetts’ reform, he was the house majority leader. According to Rep.
McDonough, Rep. Flarity played the key role in the house garnering the needed votes
for passage (Paul-Shaheen, p. 347). As Paul-Shaheen, in quoting McDonough, noted,
“the original vote for the bill was 77 to 75. If one vote had changed, it would have
killed the bill” (Ibid). In Oregon, the then- Senate president played this pivotal
leadership role while agency heads such as Jeane Thome and Chad Cheriel played the
supporting roles. Mr. Cheriel was Director of the Office of Health Policy, while Ms.
Thome was Director of the State’s Medicaid program at the time.
In Oregon, executive leadership was critical for the evolution and subsequent
implementation of the reform that took place. During the early critical period, Barbara
Roberts was governor, and she led the state through the waiver process and the
“employer mandate” controversy. Later, former Senate president John Kitzhaber
became governor of Oregon and continued the process of providing this critical
leadership. Similarly, in the other three states, executive leadership was equally
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critical to their success. Michael Dukakis provided this leadership in Massachusetts,
Lawton Child in Florida, and John Waihee in Hawaii.
Despite these similarities, there were a few differences. Oregon’s approach
was a political strategy. This political strategy involved different stakeholders who
came together at the urging of the states’ political leadership to map out a program to
solve the states’ chronic problem of lack of access to health care by uninsured lowincome residents. On the other hand, in Massachusetts the timing of national events
played a role. The presidential bid of Michael Dukakis arguably was a key factor that
led to the enactment of the Massachusetts Health Security Act. Paul Shaheen
(1998:335), quoting Catherine Dunham, stated:
As Michael Dukakis’s star rose in the presidential primaries, it allowed the
democrats in Massachusetts to rally together so that Massachusetts could be
the first state after Hawaii (to achieve reform) and the best.”

Paul-Shaheen (1998) further stated that a Democratic state Representative John
McDonough had this to say about the situation:
Some in Massachusetts felt that the bill would never have been enacted if
Dukakis’s had not been running for president. House members did not want to
mess up Dukakis’ presidential aspirations (ibid)

According to Paul-Shaheen, Dukakis himself put it this way:
The presidential campaign also played an important role. I started making real
progress in the early primaries. I talked a lot about our efforts in
Massachusetts. I think there was a genuine sense of excitement about the
campaign and about the leadership role that Massachusetts had taken on a
whole host of important issues during the previous three to four years: welfare
reform, urban revitalization, child care policy, plant closing notification, and
many more. Unemployment in the state had dropped to below three percent.
Universal health care was, in a sense, the crown jewel of a remarkably creative
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period in the states’ political history, and die presidential campaign helped to
crystallize that feeling in a very special way (Ibid).

In Oregon presidential politics did not affect its reform directly as none of its
leaders had presidential aspiration. However, in some sense, it can be argued that
national presidential politics was a latent force that affected Oregon negatively in that
as Oregon sought a key federal waiver for its Medicaid obligation, there were
unanticipated delays due to the timing of the presidential politics in that period.
Oregon needed the waiver to implement a major provision of its Basic Health Services
Act. Because of the presidential election of 1992, there were delays in providing this
waiver by the federal government.
It is important at this juncture to clarify and to an extent emphasize that it was
not that Governor Dukakis’ presidential aspiration and involvement in 1988 had a
direct impact on what was happening in Oregon at that period. The point this
researcher is making is that presidential politics, political party control of the state
legislature, and which party controlled the governor’s mansion were all key factors
that influenced State decisions to initiate and implement health care reform. In the
three states discussed in this chapter, including Oregon, these reforms took place
under Democratic governors and almost in all cases, when Democrats were in the
majority in those state houses.
During the period Oregon implemented its health care reform in 1994, the
Florida legislature defeated Governor Childs’ Health Security Proposal. In the words
of one observer, “That session, no one in the Republican camp wanted to enact Florida
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Health Security because no one wanted to give Childs a ‘platform’ to run on for
govemor”(Paul-Shaheen, p.334). In effect, the timing of state elections had its own
effect on getting reforms through the state legislature in most of those states.
Another difference between Oregon’s reform and these other states was that
Oregon’s reform was championed by an individual who came from a health care
background. John Kitzhaber’s background as an emergency room physician helped
shape his vision and insight into what Oregon needed to accomplish its health care
reform. In these other states, their leaders came from other professions and had politics
as almost their life career. Consequently, they become involved in the health refonn
crusade out o f their desire to combine personal commitment with political opportunity.
Such was the case with John Waihee in Hawaii, Michael Dukakis in Massachusetts
and Lawton Childs in Florida. They were all long-term legislators in their respective
states and in the case of Lawton Childs, a United States Senator, prior to seeking
gubernatorial office.
Finally, among all these states, Oregon’s health care reform as embodied in the
OHP was the only one with a specific process for setting priorities for health services in short, an explicit form of rationing. On the other hand, the State of Florida with its
own reform in 1984 was the first state to enact state-based revenue assessment on
hospitals to finance the state’s Medicaid program and the expansion of primary
services. Although Florida followed this tack in 1984, Massachusetts in 1988 became
the first state to legislate a “play-or-pay plan” in their reform effort.
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In summary, these three states discussed here had their unique differences and
similarities with Oregon in their reform agenda. The major thing is that Oregon’s
experiment started before President Clinton came to office. Clinton’s crusade to
reform the health care system failed just like the efforts of other presidents before him.
It failed not because it lacked popular citizen support, but because it lacked the
political support of a powerful coalition of business leaders in this country that in
essence represents the business community. On the other hand, Oregon mobilized
political support through a coalition of business, political and social advocacy groups
and so did these other states, hence their success in their reform agenda. The Oregon
approach, albeit, “prioritization” and “rationing” of health care, is therefore one of a
set of emerging models o f modem health care innovation in the United States that
health policy scholars and the nation’s political elite interested in health care refonn
will be watching closely in the years ahead.
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Chapter 6

Analysis and the Presentation of Findings

This researcher noted in chapter 3 that the data analysis for this study would
begin at the data collection phase. The researcher also indicated in that chapter that
this process o f analysis would continue throughout the course of the study. The
researcher has so far followed through with this process. Equally relevant to mention
is the fact that this research approach is consistent with the method various qualitative
researchers have suggested. As they see it, the purpose for using this approach is to
strike a balance between efficiency and design flexibility as noted by Marshall and
Rossmam (1995).
Maxwell (1996), and Yin (1984). In particular, Marshall and Rossman
(1995:111) suggest that one of the essential qualities of a good qualitative research is
“design flexibility.”
Apart from promoting efficiency, this approach to research also enabled the
researcher to filter out early in the process any o f the unusual elements not conducive
or germane to the study. Based on these premises, this researcher began the data
analysis during the data- gathering phase and has continued the process as the research
effort progressed.
Given that the analysis for this study started at the data- gathering phase, the
organizational framework for chapter 6 is to continue that process, and, as an adjunct
to the process, present the findings in an interactive manner. At this juncture, the
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researcher wishes to note that the use of the term “adjunct” does not in any way
denigrate the importance of reporting the findings in a qualitative research. Instead,
the point the researcher is making is to emphasize that the qualitative research process
is not linear, and not stepwise but an interactive process, according to Morse and
Richards (2002). This researcher previously stated this point in chapter 3. With this as
a backdrop, the data analysis for this study began as soon as the researcher started the
data gathering from various sources such as personal interviews, public documents
and other publications related to the topic o f this study. Part of this process was
listening to interview tapes priorto transcription. This process enabled the researcher
to rewrite and reorganize what information was captured in the interview tapes as well
as the rough notes of what he observed or heard during the interview. This process
helped the interviewer to develop tentative ideas, patterns, categories and relationships
o f what was emerging and the direction the research was going. For example, the
memos enabled the researcher tojreflect on the method or methods that were being
pursued, and what theories could emerge from the study. It also enabled the researcher
to assess what purposes the information gathered during this data collection phase
could serve. This process not only provided the researcher the ability to hone his
analytical thinking about the data gathered, but also facilitated the researcher’s
analytical insights on the topic of this study.
This chapter reports the findings obtained through the various interviews with
the different groups as described earlier in this study. These findings are not reported
as quantitative results but rather, to reiterate, in terms of a case study approach in
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examining the role of the business community in the evolution o f the Oregon Health
Plan (OHP). The chapter also utilizes information gleaned from other official records
and other multiple sources such as legislative hearings, testimonies, libraries, and
newspaper articles in addition to other sources already mentioned earlier in this
chapter. The advantage of using these multiple sources has been noted in Yin
(1984:20) as a case study’s “unique strength” based on its ability to deal with a full
variety o f evidence. It is also advantageous in “contextualizing strategies” for
narrative analysis in individual case studies (Maxwell,1996:78).
Given the narrow focus of this study, the analysis and presentation of this
study’s report attempts to provide an understanding of the business community’s role,
what is it that they did and why they did it during the Oregon health plan’s evolution
and implementation. It is important to add at this juncture that often times, qualitative
researchers present their findings and conclusions in a mixed form, using the existing
literature as an explicit data source to triangulate the field based findings, and
integrating existing theory into the presentation of the results of their analysis. This
hybrid approach to report presentation has been employed by this researcher at
appropriate times in this study. The researcher’s rationale for doing so is that the
analysis o f key informants’ (respondents) interviews conducted for this study fits the
format described here, with a mixture o f references to and constructs from existing
literature as well as constructs and relationships that arose from the interview data
themselves. Given these considerations, this researcher utilized the theoretical
conversations from the literature review and related the findings of this study against
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the existing frameworks. It is the expectation of this researcher that this approach is
the best way to get to the core task o f this study - i.e. to understand the role Oregon
businesses played in the evolution and implementation of the Oregon health plan. It is
also the best way to relate, verify, challenge, and / or expand existing theories of
business-political behavior in the formulation of a public policy in such a way as to
empower those wishing to promote health care reforms in their localities to bring
about a desired change.
Having stated these considerations, we now turn to the task of continuing the
analysis and presenting the findings of this academic research. For purposes of clarity,
the researcher wants to reiterate that this specific research study is not about Oregon’s
health care reform in general or the Oregon Health Plan (OHP) in particular. Instead,
the purpose o f the study is to anal yze the role the Oregon business community played
during the evolution and implementation of the Oregon Health Plan.

1. Business “self-interest” was paramount
Four respondents who shared their perspective on this question had similarities
in their answers. They seemed to agree that the Oregon business community was
divided, especially at the beginning of the health plan’s evolution. To elaborate, one of
these four respondents stated: “some businesses were more reluctant than others to
support the OHP.” This meant that even though there was some reluctance, those
businesses opposed to the OHP at the very beginning became supportive of it at the
end. This respondent also stated that the support each business group gave was
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dependent on the type of business that the business group was involved in. For
example, those businesses that were engaged in health care related enterprises
supported the health reform effort from the very beginning. Those that were not
supporting the health reform originally did not get involved supporting it actively until
they sensed that the legislation coming out of Salem might impact their business
adversely unless they got involved to influence the outcome of things. In particular,
Oregon hospitals and health systems, the Oregon Medical Association, and health
insurance companies were among the early partners of the reform effort whereas non
healthcare related businesses such as 7-Eleven, The Oregon Restaurant Association,
and the Goodwill Industries of the Columbia -Willamette were later supporters. In the
case of big business support for the OHP, its support occurred through the
instrumentality of the state’s major business lobby- Associated Oregon Industries.
It is worth noting that the four respondents who were in agreement in their
responses to the question of what role they thought businesses played in the
formulation of OHP were from two different clusters: three were from the Business
community and one from the Bureaucratic elite. This finding is consistent with
Bergthold’s (1993:811) assertion that businesses have “few interests that link them
solidly together” and that in the absence of such interests, they would have no interests
on which to act. Therefore, their support depended on what they sell, where they are
located, how large they are and who leads them. In light of theses considerations,
businesses “will continue to act autonomously”(ibid).
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2. The business community’s national interest is not the same as its local interest
This research found that the Associated Oregon Industries (AOI)’s support for
the Oregon health plan is inconsistent with Mintz and Palmer (2000) study of the
causes and consequences of American business involvement toward healthcare
reform. In their study o f business and health care policy reform in the 1980s, Mintz
and Palmer found that American business was divided into three main groups in the
matter of health care reform. Their study showed that on a national scale, non-health
care firms (businesses) championed reforms, health care businesses resisted reform,
and insurers sought to channel reform in directions that preserved their interests. They
also found that each group contained both large and small companies, with often
differing views and objectives in the health policy reform agenda. On the contrary, in
Oregon this researcher found that during the formulation and implementation stages of
the Oregon Health Plan, Oregon’s health care companies were in the forefront
championing reform instead of resisting it. This study also found that Oregon’s non
health care companies that were large employers just like their health counterparts
were in the vanguard for this reform although they were in it for different reasons.
Among those reasons was business “self interest” at the state or local level. As one
political executive (respondent #13) interviewed for this study did indicate: “.. .the
role that each one of them played depended on what their self-interests were.” In a
similar fashion, another political executive (Respondent #14) pointed out that there
were some specific factors in the OHP that appealed to business, particularly the
“prioritized list concept.” This respondent further stated that this prioritized list
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concept “essentially opened a whole new idea of controlling costs” and that if the idea
worked, it could be brought into commercial insurance.” Adding to this view was the
observation from another political executive (respondent #15) who stated:
One o f the reasons is that they were concerned about costs-shifting from uninsuring employers and from the persons who just had no health care coverage,
and the other one was that because they felt that OHP provided a mechanism
for controlling expenditures. It had within it a way for modifying the benefit
package in order to control costs and so those two factors were the primary
things that attracted the business community.

3. Economic Incentive. Self-Interest and Business -Political Behavior
Feldstein (2001) remind us that “political markets” have legislative benefits
and that when the benefits that are provided to a group exceed the financial costs the
group incurs, that group or individuals affected would “seek to further their selfinteresf’(p.9). This “self-interest” paradigm has been noted in the preceding
paragraph. From a different perspective, Mintz (1995) discusses the business
community’s behavior when it is engaged in any kind of political activity. Feldstein’s
perspective intersects with Mintz’s perspective in that legislators operate in the
political markets and business -political behavior is fed into this market. For instance,
legislators are the suppliers of legislative benefits, and with these benefits, they can
shape the political behavior of the business community. In this context, Oregon’s large
companies supported the Oregon health plan’s evolution and implementation partly
because they initially saw in that plan a potential to reap “legislative benefits” when
the plan is fully implemented. This situation is also consistent with Feldstein’s theory
of “economic interest” of business organizations. In addition to this view of Feldstein,
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the prospect o f the Oregon business community taking advantage of what economists
call “economies of scale” is another example of this legislative benefit since under this
scenario, as costs of providing insurance to employees would be lowered if more
people were covered under the government’s program and more employers
participated in the program as well. On the basis of these considerations, this
researcher found that there was an interrelationship between economic incentive, selfinterest and business-political behavior within the framework espoused by Mintz
(1995) and Felstein (2001). For instance, given the tax breaks and a variety of other
health insurance reform measures that the state o f Oregon granted some businesses
that qualified, it is clear why many of Oregon’s health care companies supported the
reform. Even non-health care companies in Oregon benefited as well. For instance, the
“prioritization” or “rationing” of care as people have variously called the Oregon
Health Plan benefited the business community as a whole from an economic point of
view. For Oregon employers that were serious about cost control, rationing of care
was an important incentive.

4. Public Interest theory
Although this research study is not designed to test theories, this research study
confirms what Feldstein’s (2001) has said were the basic assumptions about public
interest theory. As Feldstein (2001:5) points out, the underlying basic assumption of
the public interest theory is that “legislation is enacted because well-meaning
legislators act according to what they believe is in the public interest.” In the Oregon
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experience with health care reform, Oregon’s legislators under the leadership of then
Senator John Kitzhaber, the architect of the reform process, embarked on the reform
agenda with a common purpose: to “keep Oregonians healthy” (The Oregon Health
Plan: An Historical Overview, 2004, p. 1). However, after the process of reform got
underway, there was some dissatisfaction within the legislature as well as within the
business community as to the efficacy of the program. As Feldstein (2001) stated in
his analysis of the public interest theory, it is dissatisfaction with the public interest
theory that leads to the economic theory of legislation. The researcher is not in any
way suggesting that it was dissatisfaction within the business community of Oregon or
among the citizens of the state that led to the creation of the health plan. Instead, the
researcher is simply stating that the public interest theory as explained by Feldstein
(2001) has implications for the Oregon experiment with health care refonn when it is
put in context. For example, various events such as the escalating health care costs
that were occurring in Oregon and across the country during the period of the late
1980s and early 1990s were the primary reasons that most state governments got
serious with health care reform. But once these reforms got underway, regulating the
“market” became inevitable. As this researcher noted in chapter 2, government
intervenes in the market when it suspects that the market is failing or not working.
This view is held by many economists, among them W olf (1979). One way
governments have been known to intervene in the market place is through regulation.
The other way is by legislation.
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Feldstein (2001) explains that businesses or industries that are quite large are
most likely to be regulated and this exposition can partially explain why there was a
flurry of state regulations on health care during those periods. Since health care is big
business in America, there is no question that the delivery of health services is also an
area that large health care companies dominate. Hence the purpose of the regulation is
to prevent them from using their size to orchestrate monopoly abuses in the health care
market place. This situation did not appear to be case with Oregon’s experience. This
is because during the period of the Oregon health plan’s evolution and
implementation, Oregon’s medical community did not seem to be heavily regulated.
Its involvement with AOI, combined with its strong lobbying ability, made it less of a
target for government regulation. More importantly, because of its size, they were less
likely to have competitors.

5. The business community was a beneficiary of Oregon’s health reform.
Again, Feldstein’s view that there is a legislative benefit associated with
government regulation is consistent with what happened in Oregon. The Medicaid
expansion was an economic driver in some local communities in Oregon. One
Political executive (respondent #14) noted this point as well and so did one
Bureaucratic elite (respondent #7). The political executive gave the example of Coos
Bay - a small coastal community in Oregon as a place where this “economic driver”
concept was manifested. This tied in with the economic development argument that
Peterson (1979) makes when he discusses his three policy domains in the formulation
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o f a public policy. He associates this kind of situation as a developmental policy of
local governments in the context o f public policy formation. The bureaucratic elite
(respondent #7) cited the attitude of the Oregon hospital association that portrayed the
health plan sometimes as an “economic development tool” for Oregon.

6. Logic of business unity.
This research confirms that there is really no logic to business unity. In order
for the business community to unite on any issue, the issue on hand must be one that
will impact directly the operational dynamics o f the businesses involved. If there is no
overarching need for businesses to unite such as to seek favorable legislation or a
proposed public policy, business will choose to remain ambivalent and in most
instances will not unite behind the cause. The Oregon business community’s reaction
to Senate Bill (SB) 27 at the beginning of debate to establish the Oregon Health Plan
and its reaction to Senate Bill 935 (SB 935) later is instructive. In looking through the
archival records and also through testimonies from members of the Oregon’s business
community, there seemed to be wide spread support for Senate Bill 27. However,
when it came to Senate Bill 935, their reaction was vastly different. Senate Bill 935
was very controversial and consequently, it was the bill that drew the most opposition
and actually the one that divided the business community. From the perspective of the
business community as a whole, Senate Bill 27 (SB 27) did not present a major threat
to most segments of the business community in that with the bill, the business
community felt that there was going to be expanded coverage; there would be less
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cost-shifting and that they would not have to pay the cost shift. Also, the business
community equally felt there would be better control over Medicaid costs because of
the “prioritized list” that the bill promised. The whole climate of cost - consciousness
and accountability for cost of operation would reduce their cost directly or indirectly.
Therefore, business was willing to step up under those circumstances and support a
program of insurance that would make it possible for all Oregonians to have access to
health care coverage. This kind of business behavior as exemplified by the Oregon
business community during the evolution of Senate Bill 27 (SB27) underscores what
Mintz (1995) has described as broad-self interest of business firms that may overlap
individual interests of individual firms. It also illustrates what Mintz (1995) terms
“Class-wide” interests of the business community when there is no major profitability
gap between businesses within the same community. In particular, Mintz (1995)
discussion of the business community’s “broad-self interest” and “class-wide” interest
indicates how important the profitability gap is to individual business decisions. As
she points out, when there is no major profitability gap between business firms, the
business firms will have narrow-self interest. On the other hand, when there is a major
profitability gap between business firms, the business firms will have a class-wide
interest. This class-wide interest leads them to collective action.

This researcher has already noted that with SB 27, the Oregon business
community seemed united, but when it came to SB 935, it appeared to be divided
because of the individually perceived threats posed by these legislation to their
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bottom-lines. However, the lack of cohesiveness within the business community again
illustrates how the self-interest paradigm which Bergthold (1993) discusses shows up
in the behavior of the Oregon business community. For instance, during the
formulation of the Oregon health plan (OHP), Oregon’s large health care companies
tended to view reform as inevitable, and generally cooperated with the reform efforts,
whereas small health care companies most often were disposed to defending the status
quo. Again, this dynamic is what Mintz (1995) has described as business-political
behavior. Martin (1993) indirectly alluded to this characterization when she noted that
when it came to collective action, the business community seldom rallies together
because of individual self-interest. This point is further underscored by a response
given by one business executive interviewed for this study and who was involved with
AOI during the evolution and implementation of the Oregon Health Plan. When the
researcher asked the question: “In Oregon, it is known that AOI lobbies for the
interests of “big business.” What mutual interests did your organization have with
Oregon’s small businesses in reference to the OHP?” In answer to this question, this
respondent replied that big business and small business in Oregon did not share a lot in
common or mutual interests in reference to OHP. According to this respondent:

Their interests diverged there because small businesses, which made up the
vast majority o f payrolls in the state of Oregon - -about ninety-percent of
payrolls had fewer than twenty employees at the time.

This respondent further explained:
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There was a very lopsided division between small and large business in
Oregon. On one hand, it is the larger businesses that tend to be more focused
on things like public policy and the health care policy .. .the smaller business
owners have less time to focus on those things and even to focus on one thing
like how to purchase health benefits for their employees.
(Respondent #1, Interviewed by author on November 18, 2003).

On the same question, another respondent from the business community described
“common” interest between Oregon small businesses and big businesses in reference
to OHP in slightly a different tune. This respondent replied that both did not have
common interest but that they had a “mutual objective” to prevent cost shift.
Elaborating further, this respondent added:
Big business typically provide health care benefits to employees whereas small
businesses many of them don’t — several of them don’t because it is so
expensive, whereas the larger companies are sort of shifting cost or absorb
those costs easier than the smaller companies
(Respondent # 2, Interviewed by author, November 24, 2003)
Admittedly, Oregon’s small companies in general did not quite embrace Oregon’s
health care reform despite the fact that some of the proposals that were contained in
the legislation were designed to benefit them. AOI, apparently an active supporter of
these bills was at times a reluctant partner to the reform agenda. This behavior also
illustrates how uneasy businesses could find themselves feeling when they want to or
have the desire to engage in public policy making and at the same time attempting to
remain loyal to their core constituency.
Although the cost-shift issue seemed to be one of the many thorny issues
between Oregon’s large and small businesses, from the perspective of one of large
business’s representatives, cost -shift was less a problem for the business community
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relationship with the small businesses in the state. This respondent, albeit indirectly,
addressed the same question of mutual interest this way:
One o f the things that people don’t understand about AOI is that it is perceived
as big business, with 23,000 members though we are not big business. Our
demographics represent the demographics of the state of Oregon. So two
percent of our members employ over one hundred people just as two percent of
businesses in Oregon employ over one hundred people. In the cost-shift, we
didn’t. W e’ve never separated big business and small business. They are the
same issues. They just have different impacts based on the size of the business.
I mean the dollar value is going to vary on size, but it’s the same issues
whether you’re a large or a small one and proportionately, it’s the same
whether you’re large or small.
(Respondent #3, Interviewed on January 9, 2004).

7. The Business community did not initiate policy.
This research found that the business community of Oregon did not initiate
policy. It instead reacted to policy. This point was corroborated by a comment made
by one o f the bureaucratic elites (respondent #4). In his comments, this respondent
asserted that when businesses said, “we’re worried about cost shifting, we’re worried
about rising insurance premium,” Dr. Kitzhaber made it clear to them that he has
heard them and that he was going to incorporate their concerns into the OHP design.
According to this respondent, as soon as the business community became convinced of
this, “they could not then take an active role in designing what it was going to look
like, but only continue to provide advice to the governor and then react to what he
came up with.” In this context, the business community of Oregon did not initiate
policy but rather, it reacted to policy, unlike the political behavior o f their national
counterparts such as the Business Roundtable in Washington, DC - a national
business lobby group that usually gets involved in public policy formation.
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8. In Oregon, there was no typical health care coalition presence .
This research found that there was no typical health care coalition in Oregon in
general or within the business community in particular during the period prior to the
formulation of the OHP. When the process of formulating the OHP started gathering
momentum, different groups started getting organized and subsequently AOI reacted
by incorporating the issue o f the OHP in its business and political agenda. It was at
that moment that something like a health care coalition was created within the
business community of Oregon under the auspices of AOI.

9. Business community felt disappointed
This research found that the business community was later disappointed with
the way OHP was being implemented after it had been designed. For instance, at the
very beginning of the discussion regarding the formulation of OHP, the business
community showed a desire to support the program. At the time, the business
community supported the program’s evolution because of what it had hoped it would
get from the program. In particular, the medical -industrial complex of Oregon, such
as the Oregon Medical Association, the hospital systems, health care suppliers,
insurance companies, dentists, and the nurses associations were very supportive of the
program. They were supportive during the public healings leading up to the
establishment of the Oregon Basic Health Services Act, the forerunner of the Oregon
health plan. Their support of the program was based on the assumption that the OHP
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would be an opportunity to reduce cost shifting that was occurring with the state’s
medical delivery system, including uncompensated care, and that the OHP would
assist in the control of costs in that area. As an incentive to support the program, the
choice o f the business community was to have benefits reduced for program
recipients, -an idea that was embraced by then Senate President John Kitzhaber when
it came down to controlling some of the spiraling costs of the program. For instance,
the employer mandate as originally conceived contained provisions that would have
made employers provide some health insurance for their employees. Instead of this,
the business community pushed for a basic benefit package (especially something
more affordable for smaller employers of Oregon). Since the Oregon business
community is not a monolithic community, differences still existed within the
community even with all the concessions and incentives granted to it by the state in
the legislation establishing the program of health reform. As this researcher has noted
earlier in this chapter, while Oregon’s large businesses have health coverage for their
workers, the majority small businesses in Oregon did not provide their workers with
any form of health benefits until there was legislation passed by the Oregon
legislature. For example, the National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB) of
Oregon opposed the plan early when the issue o f mandates came up. This was unlike
their counterpart, Associated Oregon Industries (AOI), that took a supportive stance
early when its fears were allayed. It is important to note that this Oregon business
lobby group represents many of the Oregon’s large companies and it has a
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membership of about 23,000 companies, according to its current legislative lobbyist
on health affairs, Lisa Trussel.
It is also worth noting that the medical community as a group is heavily
represented by the AOI and therefore exerts major influence in that organization.
Feldstein (2001) has said that there are two groups that have benefited most by the
rapid rise of medical expenditures in the United States. Apart from the “aged,” which
benefits from the Medicare program of the federal government, the other group is
individuals and groups employed in the medical sector such as health care suppliers
and providers, nurses, hospitals, and physicians among others. When looked at from
this perspective, the Oregon business community benefited from the OHP although
this benefit was not universal for the entire community. However the disappointment
that business had with the implementation of OHP arises out a big misunderstanding
o f what OHP was all about and what the government’s role ought to be.
Feldstein (2001) reminds us that there is a distinction between “public interest”
and “economic interest.” Business organizations do things because of their “economic
interest.” This point has been noted earlier in this chapter. On the other hand,
governments do things in the “public interests.” Based on this framework as postulated
by Feldstein (2001) it appears conceivable that the real reason Oregon’s business
community supported the OHP was because of its “economic interest” and not
because it was enamored by “public interest” undertakings. In particular, because its
medical -industrial members pay dues, it was not ready to alienate that segment of its
membership. However, when the costs of OHP escalated, business was disappointed.
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This feeling o f disappointment is summed up in the words of one executive from the
business community:
OHP “has not succeeded in containing costs. It has not succeeded in floating
the benefit line to match the financial circumstances of the state. That has
never been more apparent than it is now when the states economy is in
desperate situation and yet the benefits that are being provided under OHP are
still very rich and very unconstrained in terms of costs.
Interviewed by author, November 18, 2003.

10. OHP: An economic development tool
This research found that some members of the business community saw the
OHP as an economic development tool. In particular, one Bureaucratic elite
(respondent#5) interviewed for this study made this observation about the business
community:

AOI really has been the only organization that has been involved too much
with the health plan. Hospitals, the hospital association as an employer, as well
as a business, has been very focused but on trying to get funding for the health
plan because health care is a huge industry in the state. So the hospital
association, really have portrayed the health plan as an economic development
tool
(Interviewed by author, December 5, 2003).

This particular respondent added, “I guess, they’ve been out there, again, more as
business than as health care providers in supporting the health plan because of it’s
more money for their bottom line.” One political executive interviewed for this study
lamented:
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It’s often times not appreciated what an economic driver Medicaid is. It’s a
very substantial economic driver. Again, especially in communities .. .You
look at a community like Coos Bay where three out of the five largest
employers are hospitals or medical groups and one-third of the patients, they’re Medicaid patients. So, and almost one-third of the folks are uninsured
at some time during the year. So, tackling any of those problems can have a
substantial effect on the area’s economy
(Interviewed by author, December 18, 2003).

Although these perspectives were almost universal among all the respondents
interviewed for this study, there was equally a general agreement among all the
interviewees and from the transcripts of legislative records that the Oregon small
businesses did not support the OHP in the ways that AOI did. In fact, in their eyes,
they did not think the economic development argument was persuasive. Instead, they
felt like their interest was not represented in the OHP. Here is how the same
bureaucratic elite summed up her feelings regarding the small business community of
Oregon with regard to the formulation and implementation of OHP.
NFIB has always been opposed. They’re small business, so were opposed at
the beginning, they’ve been opposed because they generally don’t provide
health coverage to their employees.

11. Political support of Social advocacy groups.
In the process of conducting this research study, it became apparent to the
researcher that the OHP had many constituents, not just the business community when
the program was evolving and during its implementation. Each of the constituents had
its own agenda, but all were united in their hope that Oregon’s residents would
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eventually be provided with universal coverage - an ambitious goal that all
protagonists of the reform had set. One social advocacy representative interviewed for
this study, when asked what galvanized her group to lobby for the OHP, responded:
During the consideration of changing the Oregon’s Medicaid system,
Ecumenical Ministries became involved, one, out of historic concern for the
provision of health care. Most Oregon hospitals started out as religious
institutions. The Church in Oregon has been very, very active in promoting
access to health care, so it was part of what we called “our social principle” at
Ecumenical Ministries. We wanted to achieve through a public/private
partnership, access to health care for all of those who were in need. So we
came to those discussions about OHP, playing defense because we didn’t want
to have fewer services - -that fewer essential health care services available to
the needy. We also wanted to make sure that there was an expansion of health
care to those who were not part of the categorical system.
As it was, in Oregon you had to be pregnant, you had to be on welfare, you had
to be disabled, in order to have health care and that was something that was not
acceptable to the faith community because they knew that there were a lot of
adults and a lot of people that we categorized as the “working poor” who did
not have access to health care. So in answer to your First question, health care
had been part of our concerns over many years and so it wasn’t something that
we came to because o f SB 27.
(Interviewed by author, January 29, 2004).

Another leader in the social advocacy coalition who was asked a similar question
responded this way:
And I have to say that my recollection ... is that most o f our testimony around
the OHP before this particular senate committee was cautionary. We were not
full- fledged supporters of Senate bill 27. We had a lot of concerns and our
biggest concern and probably our first point of serious impact on that
committee was when the John Kolinsky’s group was prioritizing, was kind of
trying to figure out if we could if we could actually do this. He had conveyed a
group in private. There was no public allowed. Nobody had heard of this kind
of process, and all of us who understood that what they were doing was
prioritizing the most cost effective services, - services that would be most cost
effective for the most people. We were very concerned about what that would
mean for high cost services for very vulnerable individuals or small groups of
the population for whom a very high cost procedure might make the difference
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between life and death or in some cases, employment or unemployment. So to
that particular committee at that point, we were engaged in the process. We
went to them and said, “please do not vote on this bill before you see the
results of John Kolinsky’s work. You have no business voting on a bill that
was maybe half a page long because senate bill 27, when it started, was a
concept as opposed to many pages”. We said you have no business voting on
this bill until you really understood what you were moving ahead with. And
that caused then Senate president John Kitzhaber to become very angry with
us.
(Interviewed by author, December 4, 2004).

This respondent went on to describe the membership of her organization this way:
We are a coalition of organizations. Our coalition members include labor, and
seniors, and low-income advocacy groups, and faith-based groups, and some
providers.
This group’s political support came after some arms twisting by then Senate president
John Kitzahaber. As this respondent recalled:
He called my board members to the table in a private meeting and I remember,
it was a Saturday, over coffee and he said, “Do not jeopardize this bill because
if you do, I can guarantee you there are things you want that won’t be moving
ahead. And at that point because we are a coalition, and we have many
members that are active with us, we decided to continue to articulate our
concerns about a process that created a prioritized list of services that no one at
that point had seen, and did not have any designation of what was appropriate
health care. At some point we believed that there needed to be a line below
which the state could not be allowed to go above - a list of services that was
basic and fundamental.

The implication of this political maneuvering or arms twisting by the senate
president was that the coalition of this advocacy group was not initially supportive of
the OHP at the very beginning. Their non-support at that time was not that they did not
like the concept of Oregon providing universal access to its low- income residents but
it was due to the secrecy surrounding the initial organizational meetings that was
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deciding on the prioritization and rationing of health care services- a concept no one
has ever heard o f in the United States with regard to health care reform. Another
implication of this particular political pragmatism on the part of the Oregon Senate
president is that in the policy formulation process, leaders never act alone no matter
how popular they are. Consequently, policy entrepreneurship is facilitated by
individuals and groups who serve in critical supporting roles. This realism was not lost
by the then president of the Oregon Senate. Hence, his desire to enlist the support of
groups such as this group in his strategic plan with the view to winning approval for
his legislative priority in the context o f the OHP.

12. OHP was a misunderstood program.
Based on the reading o f the legislative transcripts, personal interviews and
other records dealing with the OHP, it is apparent that these disparate groups did not
realize at the conceptualization process of the OHP that public programs are usually
designed to redistribute the resources of society or to use Feldstein (2001) and
Peterson’s (1979) words, to “redistribute income” in a more equitable manner in
society. Specifically, Feldstein (2001) thinks that to redistribute income is tantamount
to “redistribution o f wealth”p.209. Hence, Medicaid and Medicare program are
designed for the poor and for the elderly by the federal and state governments. The
Oregon business community certainly did not see it that way and neither were the
different coalition partners that offered their support to the political leadership of the
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Oregon government. This basic misunderstanding initially led to mistrust and a sense
o f deja'vu among various actors in Oregon’s health care reform drama.

13. The value of incentives for political support.

So in effect, this respondent’s observation ties in with the economic
development argument that Peterson (1979) makes. Coupled with some incentives
such as tax breaks and a variety of other health insurance reform measures that the
state of Oregon granted some businesses that qualified, it is clear why many of
Oregon’s health care companies supported the reform. Even non-health care
companies in Oregon benefited as well. For instance, the “prioritization” or
“rationing” of care as people have variously called the Oregon Health Plan benefited
the business community as a whole from an economic point of view. For Oregon
employers that were serious about cost control, rationing health care was an important
incentive to do so.

Summary and conclusions
The analysis and findings of this research effort has been made in the tradition
of a qualitative research. That means it did not test theories or hypothesis. Rather it
applied theoretical constructs from the works of a few researchers such as Mintz
(1995), Bergthold (1993), Mintz and Plamer (2000) and Feldstein (2001) to help
clarify and understand the context in which the central issues that emerged from this
academic research occurred.
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The core findings o f this research study have been articulated and presented
not in any particular linear fashion or stepwise but rather in an interactive mode. In
the process each of the findings has received a complete and detailed discussion. Since
this research endeavor did not involve quantitative analysis or hypothesis testing, the
findings and conclusions reached with it are rather tentative and speculative and
should be interpreted as such.
This research study noted several key findings. Some of the findings touched
on economic self-interest of business, the logic of business unity, and how the
business community reacts when it’s interests are not served in the context of a public
policy. Other findings of the research demonstrated the misunderstanding the business
community has as to the intent and purposes of government when it is making a public
policy decision especially at the state level. Given all these findings and analysis, the
conclusion of this chapter is that the Oregon business community is not a community
at all in the orthodox sense. It is also not a reliable partner when it comes to health
care reform because of the disparate interest of its individual members. What seemed
to be the case in Oregon during the period of the evolution and implementation of the
Oregon Health Plan is that the Oregon business community was a pseudo- business
community made up o f the “coalition of the willing.” Thus its support for the Oregon
Health Plan cannot be taken as a definite sign that in the future the community is
prepared to support any new or similar initiative by the state of Oregon in the area of
health reform.
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Chapter 7

Discussion and policy implications

In order to fully understand and appreciate what happened in Oregon, one
needs to revisit Feldstein (2001). In his analysis of government behavior, Feldstein
(2001:9) theorized that “political markets are no different from economic markets”
and thus individuals and firms seek to further their self-interest. The way Feldstein
sees it, business people pursue investments in the private market to achieve a
maximum rate of return for their firms. Therefore, if business people could behave
this way in order to maximize their return, why would they not invest in legislation if
it also offered them maximum rates of return? The short answer is: yes they would
invest. By the same token, Feldstein has also argued that organized groups are willing
to do the same and that they would be willing to pay a price for legislative benefits and
political support. Johnson (1993) adds to this perspective when she argues that
different interest groups form coalitions to achieve the group’s agenda. In terms of
policy implication, the actions or inaction of an interest group toward a proposed
public policy is a statement of how the group sees that particular public policy. In
Oregon’s case, different interest groups, the business community notwithstanding,
came out and supported the proposed reform because they saw in the reform a
potential for achieving success in an issue that their coalition partners have big interest
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in. The Oregon Health Action Campaign was the embodiment of this kind of coalition
structure with respect to the OHP.
Feldstein (2001) argues that the price o f political support for a coalition and
policymakers is the expectations both sides have in the “political market.” In other
words, the expectations bring together demanders and suppliers of legislative benefits.
In Oregon’s case, cost shifts and the escalating costs of health care in general were
huge issues in Oregon in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Therefore, when the issue of
health reform surfaced in the public policy debate in Oregon in those intervening
years, both the business community and various coalition groups saw an opportunity
to work with the state government to deal with an important issue that seemed to
dominate political debate across the nation. To these various groups, Oregon’s health
care crisis needed an Oregon solution and not a federal answer. The immediate policy
implication for this prevailing attitude was the attempt by Oregon to solve this public
policy problem by legislation. However, this was not an easy choice for the state or the
citizens of the state because finding the right mix of regulations was the tricky part of
the whole reform process. Hence there were various public meetings and forums held
around the state, legislative debates, and consultations with expert professionals to try
to come up with the right solution to the problem.
Business was an early partner in the evolution of the OHP. However, this early
partnership of business involvement was in some cases done with some reluctance on
the part of business. In particular, businesses that did not already have health insurance
were worried about the mandate and its impact on their costs. On the other hand,
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businesses that already did provide health insurance were more willing to support the
mandate and less concerned about it.
There is no question that company size and the amount of internal
resources a company has at its disposal do influence whether a company would
support a public policy. Small companies generally attempt to resist getting involved
for fear that their involvement may strain their resources.
This research study revealed that even though the business community
supported the Oregon health plan during its formulation and implementation phase,
there were divisions within the business community. But even when this was the case,
the business community was still able to mange its differences. In what Clawson et.al
(1986:810) describe as typical business-political behavior, they argue that
“corporations self -consciously avoid open political conflict” once a unified business
position has developed. In terms of policy implication for this business behavior in the
Oregon situation, one political executive (respondent #14) familiar with the situation
at the time and who was interviewed for this research explained this business political
behavior this way:
.. .business is savvy from a political point of view and business understood the
politics of John Kitzhaber. It’s important to understand that in Salem there’s a
certain point at which it’s time to either get on the bus or get off the bus,
knowing that the risk of staying off the bus are substantial and my sense is that
in the late 80s and early 90s, there was a very politically popular and powerful
bus that was labeled “health care reform” that John Kitzhaber was driving.
(Interviewed by author on December 18, 2003)

According to this respondent, “business didn’t want to be off that bus even though at
times I’m sure they weren’t very comfortable being on it”
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Considering that the Oregon business community was divided especially
around SB 935 they still pulled together at the end to let the program move forward.
This behavior indicates how the business community’s lack of unity or cohesiveness is
not a calculus in its disposition to participate in the making o f a public policy. In
short, what it reveals is that it is still pragmatic for the business community to
participate in the making of a public policy even when there is disunity within it. In
terms of public policy implications, this behavior is worthy o f note by Oregon
policymakers when they are seeking cooperation from the business community
regarding governmental action in addressing a public problem.
This researcher has previously mentioned that the plight o f the uninsured is not
a problem for government alone. Their problem is also a problem for society and by
extension for the business community. For example, Karl Fredrick, vice-president and
Director of legislation of Associated Oregon Industries (AOI) during a May 10
hearing on SB 935 stated that his association viewed the passage of SB 935 and SB 27
as a “bold and innovative step toward reducing the number of citizens in this state who
are without health coverage,” adding that the vast majority of Oregon employers
wanted their workers to have access to good, affordable health care. The policy
implication of this kind of comment by a representative of Oregon’s business
community is that the business attitude toward health care reform is not a leap-year
phenomenon. It reflects a perennial question the business community has been
searching for answers to here in Oregon and across the nation.
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Nationally, the business community is well aware of the acute crisis facing the
health care system. For that reason, they actively follow developments surrounding the
issue. For instance, at the national level, the business community gets involved in
helping to fashion legislation that influences the nation’s health care system. For
example, Maher (2003: 92) reminds us that “employers were the major cause o f the
failure of President Clinton’s Health Security Bill.” In this regard, the role that three
business groups played in the nation’s health care debate is instructive. The three
groups: US Chamber of Commerce, the Business Roundtable, and the National
Association of Manufacturers (NAM) had gotten together prior to Clinton’s health
care refonn proposal to discuss the impacts of the nation’s skyrocketing health care
cost, especially on employers. This was in the late 1980s. According to Maher
(2003:92), “all 3 groups debated reform alternatives in an atmosphere largely devoid
of political considerations.” They seemed to recognize that there were limits to what
they could do alone to counter act this cost trend. They also were well aware that the
best managed care plans that various segments of the business community had
remained exposed to government cost shifting and to cost shifting from employers not
offering health coverage to their workers. What followed was that even though all
three recognized the dilemma that the business community faced, each of them had
their own on specific agenda on how the problem ought to be solved. For example,
NAM did a survey in 1992 of its members and found that the majority of its members
approved an employer mandate so long as it was part of a comprehensive reform plan.
The business Roundtable did not embrace employer mandate and, quite predictably,
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the NFIB - a major voice for small business was unalterably opposed to an employer
mandate claiming that the mandate was costly and that it would lead to job loss. But
the mandate was Clinton’s key financing mechanism for his health care reform
package. When the Clinton plan surfaced in the mid-1990s, the Chamber of
Commerce flip-flopped. According to (Maher 2003:93), the Chamber of Commerce,
after a lengthy process had developed a policy in support of an employer mandate and
was prepared to advance this position before the House Ways and Means Committee,
but in 1994 “suddenly reversed course and totally rejected the Clinton plan.” What this
whole process reveals is that the business community at the national level tries to
initiate policy debate regarding health care issues but it is incapable of agreeing on the
right kind of policy mix on those issues.
Berghthold (1993) asked the question: Why does business care about health
care reform? The short answer, according to Bergthold (1993: 803), is that “business
pays for a large proportion of health care and insurance in the United States.”
Bergthold’s conclusion is consistent with the views that have been expressed by some
business leaders around the country. This researcher noted in chapter 1 the comments
attributed to former Chrysler Chairman Lee Iacocca that in effect attested to the
affirmative response to this intriguing question. In Oregon this attitude was prevalent
in the business community especially in the period prior to the evolution of the Oregon
Health Plan (OHP). Although the answer to this policy question did generate this
affirmative response, there are some who might disagree with that assessment. To
those who might disagree, business does not pay for the greater proportion of the
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health care in the United States. As an example, theses critics point to the costs of
Medicare which the federal government funds alone, and the Medicaid programs that
both state governments and the federal government jointly fund. At the state level,
funding for Medicaid is extremely costly and when this is combined with the federal
matching dollars according to some formula set by Congress, it consumes a great
proportion of the national health care expenditure. With the addition of Medicare
costs, one can argue reasonably that the proportion of expenditure devoted to these
programs dwarfs anything the business community is doing in terms of health care
expenditure. The broad policy implication of this situation is that the business
community is in the business of health reform not because it is interested in fixing the
problem but, to reiterate, to protect its own interest. On the other hand, governments
get involved in the health care reform movement to protect the publics’ interest. In
terms of public policy implications for this situation, a fundamental reform that is
aimed at reducing the costs of health care expenditure, whether nationally or at the
state level, should be a partnership between business and government. It should also
include other stakeholders, such as labor and social advocacy groups. In short, this
means that all consumers of health care, whether low-income or high income, should
participate in that partnership. That, it seems, was the direction Oregon was heading
with its experiment with health care reform.
From a purely economic perspective, business provides its own ethical
framework that is built around a business objective. Certainly, charity cases or
subsidization of the “public’s” business is not one of those objectives. Therefore,
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Oregon’s Medicaid expansion in the context of the Oregon Health Plan was the
public’s business and should be regarded as such.
It has been noted in this study that the American business community is not a
monolithic community. The same conclusion can be reached about the Oregon
business community. From interviewing various individuals for this study and
combing through various public records, it was clear that the business community had
erroneously assumed that the OHP would be an opportunity to reduce cost shifting in
the state’s medical delivery system, including uncompensated care, and that the OHP
would assist in the control of costs in that area. As an incentive to support the
program, the business community wanted benefits reduced for the program’s
recipients. This idea was embraced by then Senate President John Kitzhaber when it
came down to negotiating how to control some of the spiraling costs of the program.
For instance, the employer mandate as had originally been conceived contained
provisions that would have made all employers provide some kind of insurance to
their employees. Instead of accepting the provisions as written, the business
community pushed for a basic benefit package (especially something more affordable
for smaller employers of Oregon). This request was granted. However, since the
Oregon business community was not a monolithic community, differences still existed
within the community despite these concessions and incentives granted to it by the
state in the legislation. The policy implication here is that when it comes to public
programs, the economic concept of the business community dictates that self-interest
and not a humanitarian motive is the guiding principle.
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This researcher has previously noted that although there are several coalitions
in this country, the most notable and most important coalition that deals with health
care issues is the Washington Business Group on Health (WBGH). To reiterate, the
WBGH is a business lobby that is a spin-off of the Business Roundtable. WBGH has
as its main mission to lobby for major American corporations on health care issues.
This researcher previously made the point that WBGH did not exit in Oregon but in a
sense has a clone in the Associated Oregon Industries (AOI). Again, these two
organizations are different in many respects but their behavior seems to be similar. For
instance, AOI does not have health care as its main agenda but it nevertheless lobbies
on behalf of the Oregon business community on health care related matters because of
its membership composition and its divergent interests. In this context, AOI is a major
business organization that has the ability to influence a major public policy in the state
o f Oregon. Thus, the medical-industrial complex of Oregon had what looked like a
health care coalition even though the coalition did not exist independently.
It is important to reiterate that in this pseudo-health care coalition, the state’s
small businesses are represented. One instance where this pseudo-coalition exerted its
influence was when the issue of Senate Bill 935 came up for legislative hearing. This
coalition was instrumental in getting the Oregon business community what it wanted
(i.e., delaying the implementation date of the employer mandate several times and
forcing several changes in the small business refonn package). This success of the
coalition is consistent with Johnson (1993), who argues that the business community
forms coalitions to force change. The policy implication of this kind of coalition
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activity is that business activism can be fostered by self-interest o f businesses,
especially if those interests are overlapping. The overlapping scenario leads to
business collective action. Time and again, this characteristic of business behavior was
evident in the Oregon business community’s role in the formulation and
implementation of the Oregon Health Plan.

Finally, it can be argued that what happened in Oregon could not have
happened were it not for the unusual alliance between various stakeholders who
participated in formulating and implementing the health plan. These stakeholders
included social activists, ordinary health care consumers, the faith community, some
medical professionals, social workers and labor unions. Although the business
community and the state of Oregon were integral parts of this stakeholder community,
these other groups equally played significant roles. This observation was authenticated
by the response given by one social activist who was interviewed for this study. When
asked “Was there one particular individual in your group who was considered
responsible for the success of the Campaign for the OHP?” This respondent replied
this way:

I don’t think any one individual can be attributed. When the legislators saw a
list of organizations regardless of who was delivering that message, I think
that’s what carried the weight of the group. It wasn’t any one individual. It was
really the power of coalition.

In summary, Oregon’s experience in initiating and implementing the Oregon
Health Plan succeeded in part because the business community in Oregon was actively
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behind the reform. However, it is worth noting that the business community’s support
for the health plan could not have been as successful as it was if there had not been a
parallel support given by these other stakeholders such as the social activists and the
labor unions. Therefore the analysis provided by this case study gives us a good
understanding and insight into what happened in Oregon, how it happened and the
specific role the Oregon business community played in the process o f formulating and
implementing the health plan.

Lessons learned from this research
In conclusion, it is the view of the researcher that it is easy to suggest that a
health care reform like the Oregon Health Plan offers a definitive solution or a final
policy destination for the people of Oregon and its government. In politics, there is no
such tiling and this researcher cannot make that claim. In a field as complex as health
care reform, all reform programs produce wimiers and losers; they solve some
problems and exacerbate others. Every political innovation leads to a new policy
debate. Today, both the debate and the innovation are carried forward through the
institutions, interests, and ideas described in the pages of this study. As one business
executive interviewed during this research noted:

From the business sector to the private sector, it is extremely difficult to
understand with any comprehension what public health policy is about. And
public health officials have not done a good job of explaining public health
policy to the private sector. In the private sector, we have co-pays, we have
deductibles, we have premium shares, we have a number of vehicles that help
put incentives in place to use - just the right amount of care, not too much.

121

The implication o f this statement is that despite enormous research focusing on
the health care reform issues at the state-level in the United States, scholars and public
policy practitioners have not yet developed a template for explaining public health
policy to the business community. It is conceivable that this situation is part of the
reason there has been an uneasy relationship between state governments and the
business community in matters o f public health policy innovation. How to manage this
tension offers the greatest challenge to future generations of scholars and
policymakers who will be interested in developing new policy initiatives for state level
health policy innovation.
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Chapter 8

Limitations of the study and Directions for future research

This academic research study is a qualitative research as well as a single case
study. As such, the research must be understood in the context of several limitations.
First, is in the nature of a qualitative research that is not generalizable. There was no
hypothesis testing or probability sampling in the research design. Instead, the method
of sampling was a “snowball” method. Second, the research is a single case study. For
that matter, any conclusions reached by it are suggestive at best and limited to this
particular study. Feldstein (2001:15) reminds us that while case studies can make a
valuable contribution to understanding a particular piece of legislation, they do not
enable us to generalize across different types of legislation.
Another important limitation in this research study is the question of
validation. Individuals interviewed by the researcher during the data-gathering phase
of this study did not review the draft before the report was presented to the academic
committee. Therefore no additional comments were elicited as to corroborate the
essential facts and evidence presented in the research. The benefits of reviewing the
draft with the individuals or informants is that often times the opportunity to review
the draft may yield further evidence, as the informants and participants in the study
may remember new materials that they had forgotten during the initial data collection
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period. As Yin (1984:138) indicate: “A major way of improving the quality o f case
studies and assuring their construct validity is to have the draft reviewed by those who
have been subjects of the study.”
Although the researcher has indicated that the business community played a
very important role in the formulation and implementation o f the Oregon Health Plan
(OHP) especially during the debates of Senate Bill (SB 935) - the “employer
mandate,” and Senate Bill (SB 27), that does not confirm that the findings would
apply to all the business communities in the fifty states of the United States. Again, the
findings are at best suggestive. However it is important to note that during the data
gathering process, effort was made by the researcher to pursue different data gathering
techniques instead of employing a single one. This technique allowed for the data
gathered to be sufficiently rich, complex and contextual. The technique also allowed
the researcher to address the questions and support the analysis from multiple
perspectives.
It is important to reiterate that key points of the findings are based on
interviews conducted by this researcher and the records the researcher was able to
retrieve from the state’s archival records and other sources. Therefore the quality of
the data must be understood in terms of the credibility of the respondents/informants
and the quality of the data retrieved from the archives. If certain relevant documents
were missing from the archives that may affect the quality of the work this researcher
has done, then there would be a case of missing elements from the sampling frame.
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The situation would lead to poor quality data and potentially the quality of findings as
well.
Because the researcher is an outsider, there may have been particular kinds of
information people did not share with him. For example, some bureaucratic elites still
in government may not have been as candid as their counterparts who are out of state
government. And some individuals from the business community may have said what
they thought would “impress” the researcher, and not what is really crucial to the
study’s main purpose—that is to really understand what happened in those years when
the health plan was being formulated and to really provide some depth and context in
understanding what happened in the intervening years as opposed to what is
happening today with the program.
There are limitations imposed as well by who was interviewed and who was
not -the sample pool. The possibility of this can be real and presents a problem of a
missing case or elements. For example, this research study used a snowball method of
sampling or purposeful sampling technique as it is sometimes called. If it happened
that the researcher did not include appropriate individuals or included the wrong
people in the snowball sample pool that alone can distort the findings and conclusions
reached by this research.
A pitfall of qualitative research particularly if it involves historical analysis is
the issue of mortality. Some people who have a good knowledge about the subject
matter may have died or moved on to other things or places and therefore cannot be
located. Many former legislators and business people who were around during the
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formulation of OHP could not be reached during the period this researcher was
contacting people who were to participate in the interviewing process.
Another pitfall o f qualitative research as this researcher has found is that some
“business elites” and “bureaucratic elites” were willing to talk to the researcher but
they were also constrained by their “business schedule” and therefore unable to
participate in the interview process.
Although not intentionally designed, it seems that most of the business
community’s respondents represented the views of AOI and less the point of view of
small businesses in Oregon. Under the circumstance, there may be some bias in the
kind of answers this researcher received from those respondents that may not have
represented the views of the business community at large. Due to the constraints of
time, money and other resources, this researcher was not able to remedy the situation.
This research would be richer and more robust if the study had included these other
people in the interview process.
The most frustrating limitation to the researcher was funding. Lack o f funding
resources prevented the researcher from embarking on an elaborate design of a multi
case study. Perhaps other researchers fortunate enough to get financial assistance can
apply that method if they are interested in pursuing and replicating this academic study
in the future.
Finally, a major contribution of this study is that it provides a valuable insight
into state level health policy innovation that is focused on a specific state’s business
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community. The fact that the study chronicled their activities and participation in their
health reform process is a major contribution to the literature o f health politics.

Future directions

In the course of completing this study, particular avenues for further research
present themselves. These avenues require engagement with some literature that has
much a richer theoretical basis that is not included in this study. They would require
further data collection and analysis especially in a multi-case study.

Three avenues of interest are: (1) What will likely be required to sustain
business support for the (OHP)? (2) Based on the current findings of this report, and
the existing literature, state level business intervention in the health care policy
process is not universally applicable at the present time. For example, we know that
the business community is a beneficiary of government, but we don’t know if the
business community is also a benefactor of government. (3) Impact of coalition
building at the state level on health care reform needs further exploration. Most of the
existing literature documented business coalition activities at the national level but
hardly discusses them at the state level. All of these aspects of future potential
research are beyond the scope of this study but are tantalizing as promising new areas
to be pursued and examined.
Finally, it is instructive to refer to Locke (2001), who notes that once
completed it is sometimes the case that a piece of qualitative work makes a much more
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powerful contribution to a theory base other than the one the researcher had originally
selected. This is because the findings are field-generated, not theory generated. If this
research dissertation has accomplished this expectation, the time and effort that went
into doing it will have been worth it.
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Appendix A: Definition of Groups and Terms
The Oregon Business Community: This refers to all the business organizations and
their surrogates involved in the planning process and implementation o f the Oregon
Health plan (OHP). Thus the business community includes: large and small Oregon
companies, hospitals, insurance firms (both medical and non-medical), the provider
community, and doctor groups in the state of Oregon.
Social Advocacy Group.
This refers to a coalition of different organizations with special interest agenda
devoted to health care issues. The coalition includes labor, senior citizen groups, lowincome advocacy groups, faith-based groups and some provider group.
Political Executives: This refers to senior executives who serve in government on an
appointment basis. Usually they are not long career people in government. They are in
and out government.
Bureaucratic Elite: This refers to career government employees in management
position who are considered very knowledgeable in the inner workings of government.
They are very influential in their departments and are they the must-go-to individuals
when outsiders want to gain a thorough knowledge about particular issues in that
department.
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA): This refers to a federal law
enacted in 1974 that was designed to preempt states rights with regard to worker’s
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pension benefits and employee benefits. ERISA does not affect the benefits the
benefits and rights o f employees whose employer is self-insured.
Capitation: A fixed amount of money paid to a provider on a periodic basis to provide
medical services. It is generally paid to the provider for each member to them on a per
member, per month basis.
Guaranteed Issue: With guaranteed issue, Carriers must make coverage available to
any group that applies regardless of the employees.
Guaranteed Renewal: Once a company is covered an insurer must renew its coverage
and may not cancel coverage or introduce new policy exclusions at the time of
renewal based on claims or changes in health status.
High Risk Pool: A fund set up to offer health insurance to small groups and
individuals who have been denied coverage or whose medical history makes rates too
high.
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Appendix B: Informed Consent Form

You agree to take part in this research project on Oregon’s approach to health care
reform: An analysis o f the role o f the business community in the evolution o f the
Oregon health plan conducted by Peter C. Olemgbe, a Ph.D Candidate at Portland
State University.
You understand that the study involves an interview about the subject matter that will
take 1 hour to 1 1/2 hours of your time at your office or a location that is convenient to
you. Peter Olemgbe has told you that the purpose of the study is to explore and
analyze the role the Oregon business community played in the evolution and
implementation of the Oregon health plan. You can decline to answer any particular
questions or stop the interview at any point.
You may not receive any direct benefit from taking part in this study, but the study
may help to increase knowledge that may help others in the future.
Peter Olemgbe at (503) 639-5253 has offered to answer any questions you have about
the study and what you are expected to do. He has promised that all information you
give will be kept confidential and that the names of all people in the study will be kept
confidential as well unless approval has been given to associate their names with a
quote. Participants who elect to do this will have the right to review the quote before
they are published.
You understand that you do not have to take part in this study and that this will not
affect your relationship with Portland State University or my own agency.
You have read and understand the above information and agree to take part in this
study.

Date:_____________________

Signature:_________________________

I f you have concerns or problems about your participation, please contact the Human
Subjects Research Review Committee, Office o f Research and Sponsored Projects, 111
Cramer Hall, Portland State University, (503) 725-4288 or if you have questions
about the study, please call Peter Olemgbe, the researcher at (503) 639-5253.
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Appendix C: Interview Questions for the Business Community:
1. Associated Oregon Industries [AOI] was involved in the early stages of the
evolution of the OHP.
la. Did you think that the business community got involved in the early stages so
as to effect legislation?
lb. What were the main issues or concerns regarding the OHP for the business
community?
2. Businesses often have diverse interests.
2a. For the business community, what were the main factors for supporting the
OHP? 2b. Who were the key individuals in the business community responsible
for “rallying” such support for the OHP?
3. In Oregon, it is known that AOI lobbies for the interests of “big business.” 3a.
What mutual interests did you have with Oregon’s small businesses in
reference to the OHP. 3b. Prior to the implementation of the OHP, did AOI
“join forces” with small businesses in other legislation or campaigns? If so,
what were they and when?
4. Was the relationship between the AOI and the small businesses “favorable”
from the beginning in this particular campaign? 4a. If yes, what was the
“common ground” for this favorable relationship? 4b. If not, then describe the
conflicts or concerns between the two and how were these resolved in order to
campaign under the same “umbrella” for the implementation of the OHP?
5. Often the business community and the government are at opposite ends of the
spectrum on various programs and policies. 4a. Can you describe the typical
relationship between the business community and the state of Oregon? 4b.
Describe the relationship between the business community and the State of
Oregon in reference to the evolution of the OHP? What was the most important
factor that fostered this unique relationship?
6. Did the business community form other strategic alliances? If so, who were
these alliances?
7. A lot of debate surrounded SB 935 which addressed “employer mandate.”
What were your group’s specific objections to that legislation?
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8. The OHP has been in operation for more than eight years now. 8a. Has the
businesses community’s current perception of the OHP changed from its
original expectation for the plan? 8b. What is the business community’s
current opinion about the OHP? 8c. If the OHP continues as a sate program,
would your group lobby for any changes in the plan?
9. Would you like to add any additional comments regarding the current OHP
and its future for survival?
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Appendix D: Interview Questions: Bureaucratic Elite.
1. What role do you think Oregon businesses played in the formulation of the Oregon
health plan [OHP]?
2. What factors influenced Oregon business leaders to support the Oregon health plan?
3. How did specific business leaders promote the interests of their own companies?
4 .1 am aware that in response to the business community’s concern about more tax
burden, the legislation did not include a payroll tax on employers or single-payer plan
and in response to the business community’s concern about cost-shifting, the
legislation included the employer mandate but also allowed smaller employers to
voluntarily comply with the mandate by 1995. Are there any other specific incentives
granted to Oregon business in the legislation that I have not mentioned? If so what are
they and could you tell me more about them?
5. In your opinion, why was there never a unified health care coalition in Oregon in
the period prior to and immediately following the evolution of the Oregon health plan?
6. In other states like Massachusetts, Florida and Hawaii business activism was critical
in passing their healthcare reform legislation which addressed among others things,
escalating healthcare costs to businesses and the healthcare needs of the states’
uninsured. In your opinion, why did the business community in Oregon not take an
activist role as in these other states during the formulation of the Oregon health plan?
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Appendix E: Interview Questions for Labor
1.
2.
3.
4.

5.
6.

7.
8.

Did labor play an active role in the formulation of the OHP?
If not, did at what stage did labor get involved in the OHP policy-making
and implementation process?
What role did labor play in the implementation of OHP?
From the labor perspective, what were the main issue and concerns
regarding the OHP? In what ways did these issues and concerns differ from
those expressed by the business community? How did business and labor
treat each other’s issues and concerns?
Did labor form any alliances with other groups or organizations in
reference to OHP? If so, who were those allies?
What is labor’s current perception of the OHP now that it has been in
operation for several years? Has this perception changed over time? If so,
in what ways?
Do you think that OHP is meeting its program objectives? Has OHP
deviated from its mission during implementation? Please explain.
Does labor have suggestions for improving OHP? If so, how important are
these changes to labor given its other priorities?
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Appendix F: Interview Questions: Political Executives.
1. What role do you think Oregon businesses played in the formulation of the Oregon
health plan [OHP]?
2. What factors influenced Oregon business leaders to support the Oregon health plan?
3. How did specific business leaders promote the interests of their own companies?
4 .1 am aware that in response to the business community’s concern about more tax
burden, the legislation did not include a payroll tax on employers or single-payer plan
and in response to the business community’s concern about cost-shifting, the
legislation included the employer mandate but also allowed smaller employers to
voluntarily comply with the mandate by 1995. Are there any other specific incentives
granted to Oregon business in the legislation that I have not mentioned? If so what are
they and could you tell me more about them?
5. In your opinion, why was there never a unified health care coalition in Oregon in
the period prior to and immediately following the evolution of the Oregon health plan?
6. In other states like Massachusetts, Florida and Hawaii business activism was critical
in passing their healthcare reform legislation which addressed among others things,
escalating healthcare costs to businesses and the healthcare needs of the states’
uninsured. In your opinion, why did the business community in Oregon not take an
activist role as in these other states during the formulation o f the Oregon health plan?
7. Often the business community and the government are at opposite ends of the
spectrum on various programs and policies: 7 (a) Can you describe the typical
relationship between the business community and the State of Oregon? (7b) Describe
the relationship between the business community and the State of Oregon in reference
to the evolution of the OHP. What was the most important factor that fostered this
unique relationship?
8. Did the business community form other strategic alliances? If so, who were these
alliances?
9. During the evolution of the Oregon health plan the Oregon medical community
seemed supportive of the program. Can you tell me what was important in their
willingness to support the program?
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Appendix G: Interview Questions for Social Advocacy Groups:
1. During the legislative hearings leading up to the creation of the Oregon health
plan, you were one of the individuals who testified before the Oregon Senate
subcommittee on health and Bio-Ethics in support of SB 27. What was it that
galvanized your group to lobby and campaign for the creation of the Oregon
health plan?
2. How was your group formed?
3. Was the OHP campaign the first issue that brought your group together? Was
your group involved in other campaigns or issues other than the Oregon health
plan [OHP]? If so, what were they and was your group successful in lobbying
for those issues too?
4. Tell me about the relationship between your group and the Oregon business
community in reference to Oregon health plan [OHP]? How did your group
first perceive the Oregon business community in this particular campaign and
how did they initially view your group? Did any of these perceptions or views
change over time? What was the business community’s reaction to your
groups and vice-versa? What do you think contributed to this particular
relationship between your group and the Oregon business community?
5. What was the single most important factor, in your opinion, germane to your
group’s campaign for the OHP? Was there one particular individual in your
group who was considered responsible for the success of the campaign?
6. What obstacles, if any, did your group encounter and then overcome in terms
of lobbying for the OHP? Whom did your group perceive to be the greatest
concern or threat to the implementation of the OHP? What is your group’s
current perception of the OHP? Do you currently view the OHP as being
responsive to the targeted population? Does the current mission of the OHP
meet your group’s expectations? In your opinion, is the current OHP effective
in achieving its overall goals?
7. What factors continue to inspire your group’s support for the OHP? Do you
think that the OHP needs to make any major changes in its current delivery or
policies? If so, what would these changes entail?
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Appendix H: Introductory letter to Potential Respondents

Dear___________
I am a Ph.D candidate at Portland state University currently working on my doctoral
dissertation entitled “Oregon’s Approach to Healthcare Reform: An Analysis of the
Role o f the Business Community in the Evolution of the Oregon Health Plan [OHP]”.
My research is an historical analysis of the program and focuses on the legislative
process that led to the implementation of the OHP. It is a case study approach of the
OHP and will be solely used for academic purposes. Interview information shall be
reported anonymously unless participant permits researcher to quote responses.
I am kindly requesting your participation in my research [as well as other key
individuals] to elicit expert knowledge and insight relating to the legislative history,
process and implementation of the OHP. Your participation will involve granting me
a face-to-face interview in which I shall ask you a few questions related to my
research topic. I could meet you at your office or any locale of your choice. I would
greatly appreciate your time, cooperation and consideration in granting me this
interview, as it would be an important part of this dissertation research. If permissible,
I will call you in the very near future to set an appointment for us to meet in reference
to my research.
If you have any questions or concerns regarding this research, please contact me at
home [503] 639-5253 or, you may contact the Human Subjects Review Committee,
Office o f Research and Sponsored projects, 111 Cramer Hall, Portland State
University at [503] 725-8182.
Sincerely,

Peter C. Olemgbe
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Appendix I: Exhibit O f Graphic Display of Expense Component of Non-Medicare /
Medicaid Bill for 1985 of Oregon’s Hospitals.
EXPENSE COMPONENT'S OP A NON-MEDICARE/MEDICAID INPATIENT BILL
1985

M/CARE SUB (3.8%)
fT77J
M/CAID SOB (3.3%)

BAD DEBT/CHARITY (9.1%)

OTHER (24.4%)

INTEREST (2.5%)
DEPRECIATION (4.6%)

PROF FEES (4.3%)
PAYROLL (39.7%)
EMP BENEFITS (8.4%)

.crlftCE: Oregon Association of Hospitals, October 1988

THE FOLLOWING CHART SHOWS WHAT THE BILL WENT TO COVER:
PAYROLL EXPENSES
EMPLOYEE BENEFITS
PROFESSIONAL FEES (MEDICAL, CONSULTING)
DEPRECIATION
INTEREST
ALL OTHER EXPENSES (PURCHASED GOODS AND SERVICES)
SUBTOTAL
MEDICARE SUBSIDY
MEDICAID SUBSIDY
BAD DEBT/CHARITY
OTHER
~UBSIDY SUBTOTAL
TOTAL

$1,286.90
$272.23
$140.16
$150.74
$81.61
$791.05
$2,722.69

83.9%

$ 1 2 2 .5 8

$106.34
$293.88

$0.00
$522.80

16.1%

$3,245.49
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Appendix J: Exhibit of Graphic Display o f Expense Component of Non-Medicare /
Medicare/Medicaid Bill for 1987 for Oregon’s Hospitals.

EXPENSE COMPONENTS OP A NON-MEDICARE/MEDICAID IMPATIENT BILL
1987

M/CARE SUB (5.4%)
M/GAID SUB (3.9%)

BAD DEBT/CHARTTY (7.5%)
OTHER (23.9%)
OTHER SUB (1.6%)

INTEREST (2.8%)
DEPRECIATION (4.I

PROF FEES (4.5%)
PAYROLL (37.8%)

EMP BENEFITS (7.9%)
<:-clVRCE: Oregon Association of Hospitals, October 1988

THE FOLLOWING CHART SHOWS WHAT THE BILL WENT TO COVER:
PAYROLL EXPENSES
EMPLOYEE BENEFITS
PROFESSIONAL FEES (MEDICAL, CONSULTING)
DEPRECIATION
INTEREST
ALL OTHER EXPENSES (PURCHASED GOODS AND SERVICES)
SUBTOTAL
MEDICARE SUBSIDY
MEDICAID SUBSIDY
BAD DEBT/CHARITY
OTHER
SUBSIDY SUBTOTAL
TOTAL

§1,565.20
$327.36
$184.53
$196.82
$117.50
$990.06
$3,381.47

3 1 .6 ?

$221.94
$161.13
$311,62
$65.36
$760,06

18.4?

$ 4 ,1 4 1 .5 3
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Appendix K: List o f Respondents Interviewed for this study by Organization, Code
and Date.

List o f Respondents by Cluster
Cluster 1

Organization

Code #

Date of Interview

Business Community 1

November 18, 2003

Business Community 2

November 24, 2003

Business community 3

January 9 2004

Bureaucratic Elite

4

December 1, 2003

Bureaucratic Elite

5

December 1 2003

Bureaucratic Elite

6

January 9, 2003

Bureaucratic Elite

7

December 5, 2003

Cluster 2

Cluster 3

Labor

January 20, 2004

Labor

January 9, 2004
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Cluster 4

Cluster 5

10

December 4, 2003

Social Advocate

11

January 29, 2004

Social Advocate

12

December 5, 2003

Political Executive

13

January 29, 2004

Political Executive

14

December 18, 2003

Political Executive

15,

February 5, 2004

Social Advocate

